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SOURCES OF FEDERALISM: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 





A debate continues to rage in the academy and on the U.S. Supreme Court 
about the propriety of originalism as a methodology of constitutional 
interpretation.  In federalism cases both the majority and the dissent on the 
current Court appear to have embraced originalism, yet their agreement ends 
there: The Court has consistently divided 5–4 in such cases.  What explains the 
disagreement among Justices who appear to agree that the original understanding 
of the Constitution is also its current meaning? 
This Article presents the results of a study of citation patterns in federalism 
cases since 1970 and demonstrates that the Court’s current majority in such 
cases gives substantially more weight than the dissent to Anti-Federalist views.  
To the extent that the majority relies on Federalist views in establishing the 
original understanding, it is substantially more likely than the dissent to cite 
Federalist statements that appear to have been made to allay Anti-Federalist 
fears about the power of the national government or that (at a minimum) 
demonstrate more solicitude for state autonomy.  Conversely, the dissent is 
substantially more likely than the majority to cite as evidence of the original 
understanding the more unabashedly nationalistic views of Federalists; the 
majority rarely cites such statements as evidence of original meaning, choosing 
instead to discount them as outside the framing mainstream or to read them 
narrowly or in a context that renders them more federalistic in nature. 
The results of the study have implications for originalism.  Although 
proponents of originalism have defended the approach on the ground that it 
constrains judges’ ability to impose their own views under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation, the study suggests that judges seeking the original 
understanding are largely unconstrained in their ability to mold the historical 
record to serve instrumentalist goals. 
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Sometimes, seemingly meaningless quips buried deep in the footnotes 
of judicial opinions reveal more about judicial methodology than the 
reasoning in the body of the opinion itself.  Consider Justice Scalia’s 
opinion for the Court in Printz v. United States,1 which invalidated several 
provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act2 on the ground 
that Congress lacked constitutional authority to compel state and local 
officials to execute federal law.3  Justice Souter, who, like Justice Scalia, 
based his conclusion on his view of the original understanding of the 
Constitution, argued in his dissent that both James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton had each suggested in various papers of The Federalist that 
Congress would enjoy such power.4  The Court disputed Justice Souter’s 
reading, in particular finding it “most implausible that 
[Madison] . . . believed, but neglected to mention, that” state officials could 
be subject to such federal commands.5  The Court seemed less confident 
that Hamilton had rejected the view that Justice Souter ascribed to him,6 
but argued in a footnote that “[e]ven if we agreed with Justice Souter’s 
                                                                                                                            
 1. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 922). 
 3. The Court held that “the Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program,” 521 U.S. at 933, and that the Brady Act’s provisions 
requiring local law enforcement officials “to perform background checks on prospective handgun 
purchasers plainly runs afoul of that rule.”  Id. 
 4. Id. at 970–76 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 27, 36 
(Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 44, 45 (James Madison)). 
 5. Id. at 915. 
 6. The Court noted “several obstacles” to Justice Souter’s interpretation of the views 
expressed by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 27, and offered a different reading.  Id. at 911–14.  
The Court then added: “If it was indeed Hamilton’s view that the Federal Government could 
direct the officers of the States, that view has no clear support in Madison’s writings, or as far as 
we are aware, in text, history, or early commentary elsewhere.”  Id. at 915. 
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reading of” Hamilton’s writings, they still would not be entitled to 
“determinative weight.”7 
Justice Scalia’s explanation for why Hamilton’s views would not carry 
the day is both striking in its candor and telling in its implications for 
originalism, which accords dispositive weight to the original understanding 
of the Constitution.  He argued that relying so heavily on Hamilton’s views 
“would be crediting the most expansive view of federal authority ever 
expressed, and from the pen of the most expansive expositor of federal 
power.”8  Justice Scalia noted that “Hamilton was ‘the most nationalistic of 
all nationalists in his interpretation of the clauses of our . . . Constitution,’”9 
and argued that “[t]o choose Hamilton’s view . . . is to turn a blind eye to 
the fact that it was Madison’s—not Hamilton’s—that prevailed, not only at 
the Constitutional Convention and in popular sentiment, but in the 
subsequent struggle to fix the meaning of the Constitution by early 
congressional practice.”10 
How could the Court in Printz—one of the most avowedly originalist 
decisions of recent years11—dismiss the views of one of the most cited and 
                                                                                                                            
 7. Id. at 915 n.9. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 915–16 n.9 (quoting CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 199 (1964)). 
 10. Id. at 916 n.9 (citing ROSSITER, supra note 9, at 44–47, 194, 196; 1 RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION 366 (Max Farrand ed.). 
 11. The Court noted several times that its objective was to discern the original 
understanding of the Constitution, see id. at 905 (considering early congressional enactments 
because they “provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning” 
(quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986) (internal quotations omitted))); id. at 
907 (“These early laws establish, at most, that the Constitution was originally understood to 
permit imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions . . . .”); id. at 910 
(“[T]he Government also appeals to other sources we have usually regarded as indicative of the 
original understanding of the Constitution.”), and Justice Scalia’s opinion relied extensively on 
The Federalist as evidence of that understanding.  Justice Scalia cited thirteen different Federalist 
papers, and often quoted from them directly. 
Justice Scalia’s opinion was not the only one that followed this mode of inquiry.  Justice 
Stevens framed his dissent largely as a challenge to the Court’s interpretation of the historical 
record, see id. at 954 & n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]here should be a presumption that if the 
Framers had actually intended such a [constitutional] rule, at least one of them would have 
mentioned it.”); and, as suggested above, Justice Souter based his dissent almost entirely on his 
contrary reading of The Federalist, see id. at 971–76 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“In deciding these 
cases, which I have found closer than I had anticipated, it is The Federalist that finally determines 
my position.”).  Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion was also avowedly originalist, arguing that 
the Court should “temper [its] . . . Commerce Clause jurisprudence and return to an interpretation 
better rooted in the Clause’s original understanding.”  See id. at 937 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(quotations omitted). 
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influential framers?12  Justice Scalia’s response presumably would track the 
explanation he gave in his Tanner Lectures: 
I will consult the writings of some men who happened to be delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention—Hamilton’s and Madison’s 
writings in The Federalist, for example.  I do so, however, not because 
they were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative and 
must be the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other 
intelligent and informed people of the time, display how the text of 
the Constitution was originally understood.13 
His search for original meaning, in other words, leads him to ask what 
a reasonable interpreter of the Constitution at the time of the ratification—
the “reasonable ratifier,” to use John Manning’s phrase14—would have 
understood the Constitution to mean.  If the reasonable ratifier was, with 
respect to the question at issue, less “nationalistic” (to use Justice Scalia’s 
term) than Hamilton, then Hamilton’s views do not accurately “display 
how the text of the Constitution was originally understood.”15 
Although this justification for selective reliance on Hamilton’s views 
tends to allay one’s initial concerns about an originalist Court’s discounting 
of what is otherwise standard originalist material, it is ultimately 
unsatisfying;16 indeed, Justice Scalia’s rationale17 raises several important 
and ultimately intractable questions.  Perhaps the most obvious is this: How 
can the Court confidently discern the views of the metaphysical reasonable 
ratifier18 when the bulk of the evidence for the reasonable ratifier’s views is 
drawn from the writings of the “intelligent and informed people of the 
                                                                                                                            
 12. Indeed, the same five Justices who constituted the majority in Printz joined in the 
majority opinion in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), which referred to Alexander 
Hamilton, along with John Marshall and James Madison, as “influential Framers,” id. at 70.  I 
discuss below (at great length) the Rehnquist Court’s treatment of Hamilton and other prominent 
voices from the ratification period. 
 13. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann et al. eds., 1997). 
 14. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (1998). 
 15. Scalia, supra note 13, at 38. 
 16. The same argument applies to selective reliance on any other framer’s views.  For 
example, the Court has rejected Madison’s apparent view of the scope of Congress’s spending 
power as unduly narrow, accepting instead Hamilton’s more expansive view.  See United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–67 (1936); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937). 
 17. A majority of the Court appears to have accepted Justice Scalia’s view in federalism 
cases.  See infra notes 285–310 and accompanying text. 
 18. Most originalists (including Justice Scalia) apply an objective standard of 
interpretation.  See Scalia, supra note 13, at 38 (describing search for “objective meaning”); see 
also Manning, supra note 14, at 1339. 
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time,”19 only some of which represent, depending on the issue, accurate 
evidence of the original understanding?  Merely stating the question 
highlights the circular nature of the inquiry.20 
If we could confidently say, as a historical matter, that the published 
views of one or several participants in the battle over ratification simply did 
not accord with the conventional understanding of the Constitution’s 
meaning at the time—if, for example, a member of the Virginia ratifying 
convention had argued that the “Congress” referred to in the Constitution 
was in fact the British Parliament—then it would make sense systematically 
to discount that person’s views about the meaning of the Constitution.21  
But neither side in the Court’s current debate over the Constitution’s 
allocation of authority between the federal government and the states has 
rested its arguments about original understanding on the rantings of a 
ratification-era lunatic.  Instead, in the Court’s most recent federalism 
cases, the majority of five Justices who are generally sympathetic to claims 
of state autonomy22 have canvassed the same materials on which the 
                                                                                                                            
 19. Scalia, supra note 13, at 38. 
 20. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1601, 1639 (2000) (noting “that original meaning and intent are frequently hard to 
separate, especially where the same sorts of evidence would be used to divine both”). 
 21. That is, it would make sense if one accepts originalism as the appropriate method of 
constitutional interpretation.  As I discuss below, see infra notes 58–77 and accompanying text, 
there are several compelling critiques of originalism.  This Article seeks to buttress those critiques 
by examining how members of the Court have deployed this interpretive methodology. 
 22. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas have 
typically voted to uphold claims of state sovereignty, and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer have generally dissented.  Indeed, federalism cases decided since Justice Breyer’s 
appointment to the Court have most often produced the identical line-up in 5–4 decisions against 
the challenged assertion of federal power, see, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 
535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Printz v. 
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), although there have been some notable exceptions, see, e.g., Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O’Connor joining Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in holding that the Family and 
Medical Leave Act validly abrogates the states’ sovereign immunity); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Justice Kennedy joining Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer in holding that the states lack power to restrict the number of terms federal representatives 
may serve). 
The pattern of 5–4 decisions was substantially the same during the first eight years of William 
H. Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice.  See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); 
Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).  The only notable 
exceptions before Justice Breyer’s appointment were Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 
(1989), in which Justice White cryptically joined a plurality of four Justices to hold that Congress 
had authority pursuant to the Commerce Clause to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity (later 
6 52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2004) 
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dissenters have relied and come to different conclusions about the original 
understanding.  Those five Justices have regularly sided with the states in 
federalism disputes, whereas the four consistent dissenters have sided with 
the federal government. 
It is not unusual for historians to draw sharply differing conclusions 
from the same body of materials,23 and originalism is, after all, “a task 
sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.”24  In recent 
federalism decisions, however, the majority has so robustly opposed federal 
power that some commentators have suggested that the majority has, in 
effect, accepted the views of the framing-era Anti-Federalists, who opposed 
ratification of the Constitution largely on the ground that it would give too 
much power to the federal government.25  Although these suggestions have 
been based less on the Court’s interpretive methodology than on the 
Court’s general tendency to side with the states in federalism disputes, 
Justice Scalia’s discounting in Printz of Hamilton’s views suggests that the 
                                                                                                                            
overruled in Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), 
in which Justice Souter added a sixth vote in favor of the state’s claim. 
 23. Compare EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1763–89 (1956) 
(arguing that the American Revolution and the lead-up to the Constitution were driven by a 
belief in the virtues of republican government), with CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Transaction Publishers 1998) 
(1913) (arguing that the Constitution was the product of economic self-interest). 
 24. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 857 (1989). 
 25. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the 
Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741, 741 (2000) (referring to the “Court’s defenders of state 
sovereignty” as “Anti-Federalists”); Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on 
Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1135 (2000) (“Rather than 
echoing Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, the Court’s language often 
seems more reminiscent of the views of their opponents.”); John E. Nowak, The Gang of Five & the 
Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1091, 1093 
(2000) (stating that the Court’s recent state sovereign immunity decisions “reflect Anti-
Reconstruction, and to some extent Anti-Federalist, ‘philosophy’”); Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s 
“Old Deal”: What’s Right and Wrong With Conservative Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 205 
(2000) (“[T]he late Eighteenth Century political thought most consistent with Rehnquist’s view 
of state sovereignty belonged to the Anti-Federalists, for whom the Constitution was a significant 
political defeat precisely because it did not embody their political philosophy.”); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend the Future—Or Reveal 
the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 138 n.137 (1999) (“Some have referred to 
[Alden v. Maine, College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, and 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank] . . . as the ‘federalism 
trio,’ though perhaps the appellation ‘antifederalist trio’ would be more appropriate.”); Louise 
Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113, 1167–
69 (2001) (arguing that Alden v. Maine is based on the views of “our Anti-federalist founders”); see 
also Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1369 
(1982) (“Justice Rehnquist’s ‘Framers’ sound superficially like Jefferson, remarkably like the 
opponents of the Constitution, and not at all like the statesmen who created the Constitution and 
battled successfully for its ratification in the thirteen state conventions.”). 
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Justices who have led the federalism revival may be justifying their 
federalism decisions on the founding-era views of individuals who were 
avowed opponents of the Constitution’s ratification. 
The Court’s dismissal of Hamilton was unusual in its directness, but a 
careful study of the Court’s recent federalism decisions demonstrates that it 
was hardly anomalous.  For this Article, I reviewed every federalism 
decision since 1970 (and hundreds of pre-1970 decisions) to determine 
whether there is a difference between the founding-era views that the 
current federalism majority cites and those that the current dissenters cite.  
I divided citations to founding-era views into three general categories: 
nationalistic statements by Federalists and other proponents of the 
Constitution; more tempered, federalistic statements by Federalists offered 
as responses to Anti-Federalist arguments about the Constitution’s 
meaning; and statements by Anti-Federalists about the Constitution’s 
meaning. 
The study reveals that in federalism cases, the Justices in the majority 
are substantially more likely than the dissenters to cite as authoritative 
evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning the concerns expressed by 
Anti-Federalists and others during the ratification period who strongly 
opposed ratification of the Constitution.  Moreover, to the extent that the 
current majority relies on the views of Federalists and other founding-era 
proponents of the Constitution, the majority is substantially more likely than 
the current dissenters to cite statements intended to address and allay Anti-
Federalist concerns.  Finally, the dissenters are significantly more likely 
than the majority to cite as authoritative evidence of the original 
understanding the unabashedly nationalistic statements of some of the 
Constitution’s supporters. 
The aim of this survey—and this Article—is not to demonstrate which 
view of the original understanding is correct; rather, its goal is to illustrate 
that the manner in which the members of the Court have deployed 
originalism as an interpretive methodology undercuts one of originalism’s 
principal justifications to a more serious degree than that conceded by the 
methodology’s strongest proponents.  As Justice Scalia explains it, 
originalism is justified in part because it is more likely than other methods 
of constitutional interpretation to avoid the “main danger in judicial 
interpretation . . . —that the judges will mistake their own predilections for 
the law.”26  This is so, he argues, because originalism “establishes a historical 
                                                                                                                            
 26. Scalia, supra note 24, at 863; see also Scalia, supra note 13, at 41–47. 
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criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the 
judge himself.”27  Chief Justice Rehnquist has made the same argument.28 
Justice Scalia acknowledges that the “practical defect[ ] of originalism” 
is that “it may indeed be unrealistic to have substantial confidence that 
judges and lawyers will find the correct historical answer to” all questions of 
original meaning.29  He recognizes that “[t]here is plenty of room for 
disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how 
that original meaning applies to the situation before the court.”30  This 
concession seems substantially understated when applied to the recent 
federalism decisions, which have revealed such starkly different views of the 
Constitution that the regular dissenters have staunchly refused to accept as 
precedent an increasing number of decisions.31  The competing views on the 
Court of the original understanding are so fundamentally different—and 
the difference between the sources that are offered to justify the competing 
views so demonstrable—that one must wonder whether the Justices have 
been able to distinguish their own preferences about distribution of 
authority in a federal system from those of the reasonable ratifier.  
Ironically, this problem has been brought into stark relief by the practice of 
the Justices on both sides of the federalism debate to treat the original 
understanding as dispositive, at least in federalism disputes.  If both the 
majority and the dissent seek to discern the original meaning of the 
                                                                                                                            
 27. Scalia, supra note 24, at 864. 
 28. Then-Justice Rehnquist argued: 
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is no basis other than 
the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve as a platform for the launching of 
moral judgments.  There is no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to 
you that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your 
conscience, and vice versa. Many of us necessarily feel strongly and deeply about our own 
moral judgments, but they remain only personal moral judgments until in some way 
given the sanction of law. 
William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 704 (1976).  The 
only way to avoid this “civil war of consciences,” Powell, supra note 25, at 1319, he argued, is to 
“derive a . . . ‘set of values . . . from the language and intent of the framers’ by ‘detached and 
objective’ interpretation.”  Rehnquist, supra, at 695. 
 29. Scalia, supra note 24, at 863. 
 30. Scalia, supra note 13, at 45. 
 31. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 699 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am not yet ready to adhere to the proposition of law set 
forth in Seminole Tribe”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I 
expect the Court’s late essay into immunity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experiment 
in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the other, as indefensible, and probably as 
fleeting.”); cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell out 
further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again command the support 
of a majority of this Court.”). 
Sources of Federalism 9 
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Constitution, but in so doing choose to privilege starkly different founding-
era views, then it is natural to ask whether the problem lies not with their 
respective success in revealing the original meaning, but rather with 
originalism itself. 
The ultimate problem lies in the difficulty of discerning objective 
meaning in a broadly worded document that attempted to strike 
compromises among competing interests, the ratification of which invited 
proponents and opponents alike to urge particular constructions of the 
document that would serve their immediate ends.32  Many argue that the 
proper resolution for the Court’s current federalism debate is for the Court 
to accept the “correct” account of the original understanding.33  My study of 
the Court’s treatment of the historical materials suggests, however, that the 
defect lies in originalism itself.  The ability of the current Justices to find 
support in the historical record for sharply conflicting views of the original 
understanding demonstrates that one of the principal defenses of 
originalism—that its objective of fixed, historical meaning constrains the 
ability of judges to impose their own views under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation—is overstated at best and illusory at worst. 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides an overview of 
originalism as an interpretive methodology and its embrace by both the 
current majority and dissent as the appropriate means of constitutional 
interpretation in federalism cases.  Part II.A describes the Constitution’s 
drafting and ratification with particular attention to the debates between 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists in order to provide the background for 
consideration of the Court’s treatment of the historical materials; Part II.B 
notes some of the difficulties of finding original meaning given the complex 
history of the ratification. 
Part III presents the findings of the study, which illustrate the 
demonstrable difference between the founding-era views cited by the 
majority and by the dissent.  Finally, Part IV addresses the implications for 
originalism of this systematic disagreement. 
                                                                                                                            
 32. See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 10 (1996). 
 33. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101 (2001); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A 
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the 
Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: 
Five Authors In Search of a Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000); Caleb Nelson, Sovereign 
Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1561 (2002). 
10 52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2004) 
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I.   ORIGINALISM AS A METHOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Originalism is a theory of constitutional interpretation that assigns 
dispositive weight to the original understanding of the Constitution or the 
constitutional provision at issue.  Originalism thus requires that a 
constitutional provision be interpreted as it was understood when it was 
drafted and ratified, not according to the meaning that subsequent 
generations have ascribed to it.  Originalism therefore requires reference to 
framing-era understandings to determine the meaning of the Constitution 
today.  Stated another way, originalism holds that the meaning of the 
Constitution does not change; its present meaning is its framing-era 
meaning. 
This description of originalism is deceptively simple.  As the most 
prominent adherents of the view concede, “[t]here is plenty of room for 
disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how 
that original meaning applies to the situation before the court.”34  Over the 
years proponents of what can generically be called originalism have 
disagreed over whether an originalist court’s goal should be to ascertain the 
original meaning of the text, to determine the intent of those who framed 
or drafted the provision, to reveal the original understanding of the 
provision by some other actors in the process, or to infer the original values 
that led to the adoption of the provision.35  In recent years, a consensus has 
begun to develop that the appropriate objective is to discern the original 
meaning of the text, determined by reference to the understanding of the 
provision at the time of its adoption.36 
Even among professed originalists who agree that the original 
understanding is the key to determining original meaning, there is 
disagreement over whose understanding matters.  Some have argued that 
                                                                                                                            
 34. Scalia, supra note 13, at 45; see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: 
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 163 (1990) (acknowledging that the original 
understanding is not always easy to discern, and that “two judges equally devoted to the original 
purpose may disagree about the reach or application of the principle at stake and so arrive at 
different results, but that in no way distinguishes the task from the difficulties of applying any 
other legal writing”). 
 35. See Richard S. Kay, “Originalist” Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 335, 336–40 (1996). 
 36. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 681–82 (1991) (distinguishing between “sophisticated” and 
“unsophisticated” versions of originalism); Scalia, supra note 13, at 38 (“What I look for in the 
Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what 
the original draftsmen intended.”). 
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the understanding of the framers themselves is authoritative;37 others have 
maintained that the understanding of those who voted in state ratification 
conventions is dispositive;38 still others have focused on the understanding 
of average citizens at the time of the framing.39  To complicate matters, 
some commentators have maintained that although the understanding of 
the average citizen is authoritative, evidence of ratifier40 or framer41 
understanding generally suffices to demonstrate original meaning.42  
Assuming agreement on whose understanding we should seek, the main 
                                                                                                                            
 37. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987); U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ORIGINAL 
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 9 (1987). 
 38. See Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. 
COMMENT. 77 (1988) (arguing that the framers believed that ratifiers’ intent, but not framers’ 
intent, would matter to determining the original understanding); Manning, supra note 14, at 1339 
(reasonable ratifier); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the Framers, and the Role of the 
Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512 (1988) (ratifiers). 
 39. See Perry, supra note 36, at 677 (“It is the meaning to, or the understanding of, those, 
the enfranchised, in whom sovereignty ultimately resides and on whose behalf the ratifiers 
acted—those the ratifiers ‘represented’—that should matter.”); Scalia, supra note 13, at 3, 23–25. 
 40. See Perry, supra note 36, at 677 (arguing that because what the ratifiers “understood a 
proposed constitutional provision to mean is substantially what the public they represented 
understood, . . . the ratifiers’ understanding can be taken, at least provisionally, as an adequate 
approximation of the original public understanding”); see also BORK, supra note 34, at 144 ( 
“[W]hat the ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what the public of 
that time would have understood the words to mean.”). 
 41. See Scalia, supra note 13, at 38 (justifying his willingness to consult framers’ writings on 
the ground that “their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed people of the time, 
display how the text of the Constitution was originally understood”); see also BORK, supra note 34, 
at 144 (arguing that the framers’ views “are merely evidence of what informed public men of the 
time thought the words of the Constitution meant”). 
 42. As Robert Clinton has explained, although originalism is “an inquiry that purports to 
be objective because it focuses on the meaning of language as understood when the constitutional 
document was drafted,” in its application it 
contains considerable subjective elements.  Ultimately, this approach does not ask simply 
what the constitutional words mean; it asks what they meant to a particular universe of 
persons at the time they were propounded.  For the original constitutional document, 
that interpretive universe may include the members of the Philadelphia Convention, the 
members of the state ratification conventions, or the “We the People of the United 
States” referred to in the preamble.  Whatever the relevant interpretive constituency, 
however, the inquiry nevertheless is how they understood the language rather than what 
the language connotes today. 
Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of “This 
Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1181 n.4 (1987).  Even assuming agreement on whose 
understanding is relevant, a court must be cognizant of the fact that it is reading not only text but 
political argumentation from a different period in our history.  Accordingly, some commentators 
have discussed the need to understand the “political grammar” and “interpretive conventions” of 
the relevant time period.  See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 519 (2003); H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. 
L. REV. 949 (1993). 
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evidence of that understanding—the historical materials from the debates 
over the framing and ratification of the Constitution and its subsequent 
amendments—may at best be inaccurate and at worst “have been 
compromised—perhaps fatally—by the editorial interventions of hirelings 
and partisans.”43 
Once one overcomes these difficulties, however, the principal 
conventional defenses of originalism are relatively straightforward.44  
Adherents contend that originalism is the only method of constitutional 
interpretation that is consistent with the notion that the Constitution is a 
form of law, albeit a special kind of law.  Like any other law, the 
Constitution “has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices 
familiar to those learned in the law.”45  “When we speak of ‘law,’” Judge 
Bork has argued, “we ordinarily refer to a rule that we have no right to 
change except through prescribed procedures,” such as those provided in 
Article V of the Constitution.  This view of law “assumes that the rule has a 
[fixed] meaning independent of our own desires.”46 
As Michael McConnell has explained, “[i]f the Constitution is 
authoritative because the people of 1787 had an original right to establish a 
government for themselves and their posterity, the words they wrote should 
be interpreted—to the best of our ability—as they meant them.”47  If the 
Constitution does not mean what they thought it meant, he argued, but 
rather “is authoritative only to the extent that it accords with our 
independent judgments about political morality and structure, then the 
Constitution” would not be law in any meaningful sense, but instead would 
be simply “a makeweight.”48  Judge Easterbrook made the same point with 
reference to contract theory: “[T]he Constitution was designed and 
approved like a contract,” and “contractarian views imply 
originalist . . . interpretation by the judicial branch.”49 
                                                                                                                            
 43. James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary 
Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2, 13–24 (1986). 
 44. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV.  875, 899 (2003) (summarizing defenses of originalism). 
 45. Scalia, supra note 24, at 854; see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 3 (1980). 
 46. BORK, supra note 34, at 143. 
 47. Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1127, 1132 (1998). 
 48. Id. at 1129. 
 49. Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119, 
1121 (1998); see also Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613 
(1999); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of 
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1788 (1997). 
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Proponents of originalism further contend that democratic political 
theory requires that the Constitution be interpreted according to its 
original meaning.50  This defense actually embraces two points.  The first is 
that if “[a]ll power stems from the sovereign people, and the authority of the 
Constitution comes from their act of sovereign will in creating it,” then “[i]t 
follows that the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with 
their understanding.”51  In other words, it would be unfaithful to the 
legitimately and democratically expressed aspirations of the founding 
generation to interpret the Constitution—the expression of those 
democratic aspirations—in a manner inconsistent with the founding 
generation’s understanding.  The second is that originalism is more faithful 
to current expressions of majority will through democratic processes.  
Approaches other than originalism, originalists contend, inevitably seek 
constitutional meaning in evolving or current values: As Justice Scalia has 
argued, a “democratic system does not, by and large, need constitutional 
guarantees to insure that its laws will reflect ‘current values.’  Elections take 
care of that quite well.”52  With its “attempt to adhere to the principles 
actually laid down in the historic Constitution,” adoption of the originalist 
methodology “will mean that entire ranges of problems and issues are placed 
off-limits for judges,” who are not elected, at least at the federal level.53 
Originalists also argue that the methodology constrains the ability of 
judges to impose their own views under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation.  Justice Scalia has argued that the “main danger in judicial 
interpretation . . . is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for 
the law,” and that nonoriginalism, “which under one or another 
formulation invokes ‘fundamental values’ as the touchstone of 
constitutionality, plays precisely to this weakness.”54  Proponents concede 
that often it is difficult to achieve consensus on what the original 
understanding was,55 but they argue that “the practical defects of originalism 
are defects more appropriate for the task at hand—that is, less likely to 
                                                                                                                            
 50. See BORK, supra note 34, at 143 (“[O]nly the approach of original understanding meets 
the criteria that any theory of constitutional adjudication must meet in order to possess 
democratic legitimacy.”) 
 51. McConnell, supra note 47, at 1132. 
 52. Scalia, supra note 24, at 862. 
 53. BORK, supra note 34, at 163; accord Scalia, supra note 24, at 862 (“[O]riginalism seems 
to me more compatible with the nature and purpose of a Constitution in a democratic system.”). 
 54. Scalia, supra note 24, at 863. 
 55. See id.; BORK, supra note 34, at 163 (acknowledging that “two judges equally devoted 
to the original purpose may disagree about the reach or application of the principle at stake and so 
arrive at different results, but that in no way distinguishes the task from the difficulties of applying 
any other legal writing.”). 
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aggravate [this] most significant weakness of the system of judicial review.”56  
Although there is “plenty of room for disagreement as to what original 
meaning was, and even more as to how that original meaning applies to the 
situation before the court . . . [,] the originalist at least knows what he is 
looking for: the original meaning of the text,” not some broader and more 
amorphous notion grounded in the judge’s own views of justice and 
morality.57 
Originalism nevertheless has more than its share of critics.58  One 
frequent criticism of originalism is methodological.  Critics of modern 
originalism observed that “the nature of historical materials and the uses 
judges can make of them create serious problems.”59  Such historical 
materials are often “incomplete, inaccurate, or conflicting.”60  More 
seriously, judges are not necessarily well equipped to engage in historical 
inquiry, and they might slant the history to serve instrumentalist goals.61  
Even if these problems associated with the use of history are not 
insurmountable, some critics contend that the framers themselves might 
not have thought that the Constitution would be interpreted by subsequent 
generations according to the framers’ original understanding.62  According 
                                                                                                                            
 56. Scalia, supra note 24 at 863. 
 57. Scalia, supra note 13, at 45.  Justice Scalia has even acknowledged that originalism 
cannot completely “inoculate[ ] against willfulness”; but he finds originalism preferable because 
“unlike aspirationism[,] . . . it does not cater to it.”  Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 140. 
 58. Much of the early criticism of originalism focused on the pitfalls of ascertaining original 
intent, as opposed to original meaning.  See, e.g, LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION (1988); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY 
IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).  More sophisticated versions of originalism focus not 
on subjective intentions but on objective meaning.  See Perry, supra note 36, 681–82.  I focus on 
responses to those approaches. 
 59. Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always 
Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1032 (1977). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 1033; CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF 
HISTORY 25 (1969); Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
119, 122 n.13, 156; Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American 
Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 77 (1963); see also Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of 
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 470–71 (1981) (arguing that originalist claims to neutrality are 
pretense because the choice of one mode of interpretation over another is itself a political 
decision). 
 62. After “examin[ing] the historical validity of the claim that the ‘interpretive intention’ 
informing the Constitution was an expectation that future interpreters would seek the 
instrument’s meaning in the intentions of the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia,” H. Jefferson Powell concluded that “the original intentionalism was in fact a form 
of structural interpretation.  To the extent that constitutional interpreters considered historical 
evidence to have any interpretive value, what they deemed relevant was evidence of the 
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to this view, recourse to the framing-era understanding tends to refute 
originalism.63 
Another frequent attack on originalism is that it is ultimately 
indeterminate.  Because the participants in the original debates over the 
drafting and ratification of the Constitution and its amendments for the 
most part waged their battles over generalities and broad principles, it is the 
rare dispute today that can find a direct answer in the historical record in 
which originalists seek the original understanding.64  Stated another way, 
we might be able to ascertain the original understanding with respect to 
questions of a high order of generality, but we cannot expect the same with 
respect to the particularized questions of constitutional law that are bound 
to arise today.65 
A more fundamental attack on originalism focuses on the doctrine’s 
“dead hand” problem.66  “Probably the most prevalent argument against 
originalism is that it is too static, and thereby disregards the need to keep 
the Constitution up to date with changing times.”67  Under this view, “a 
                                                                                                                            
proceedings of the state ratifying conventions, not the intent of the framers.”  H. Jefferson Powell, 
The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 886, 888 (1985) (footnotes 
omitted).  Powell’s argument was devastating to those who claimed that the intent of the framers 
should be given dispositive weight, but it did not meaningfully undermine the view that the 
original understanding is authoritative. 
 63. John Hart Ely offered a variation on this theme by arguing that some provisions of the 
Constitution—particularly the 9th Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
14th Amendment—themselves require judges to go beyond the understanding of those provisions’ 
framers and ratifiers.  See ELY, supra note 45, at 28. 
 64. See RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 10 (“With its pressing ambition to find determinate 
meanings at a fixed moment, the strict theory of originalism cannot capture everything that was 
dynamic and creative, and thus uncertain and problematic, in the constitutional experiments of 
the Revolutionary era . . . .”); Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: 
The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 398 (1989) (“History can illustrate what 
has happened . . . . But, history cannot, alas, tell us how to rule ourselves.  The texts of the debates 
over the Constitution cannot reveal, as a Delphic oracle might, what the intentions of the framers 
were for the specific policy questions that trouble our generation.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 
13, at 115, 122 (“[K]ey constitutional provisions, as a matter of their original meaning, set out 
abstract principles rather than concrete or dated rules.”).  Professor Dworkin also makes this point 
by distinguishing between what he calls “semantic originalism” and “expectation originalism.”  
The former refers to what some officials “intended to say” in enacting the language they used, and 
the latter refers to what they intended—or expected or hoped—would be the consequences of their 
saying it.  Id. at 119 (emphasis added).  It is appropriate, he says, to consider the former, but not 
the latter.  Cf. Perry, supra note 36, at 704–05 (“[I]f a practice violates a principle established by 
the ratifiers, the practice is unconstitutional even if the ratifiers would or might have resolved the 
issue differently.”). 
 66. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 1119; McConnell, supra note 47; Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085 (1998). 
 67. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1085, 1095 (1989). 
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constitutional system that makes formal amendments very difficult and does 
not allow for gradual change through interpretation is likely to become rigid 
and out-of-date,”68 thus threatening to “make the Constitution itself 
unworkable.”69  This critique goes beyond arguing that strict adherence to 
the original understanding requires abandonment of large parts of current 
constitutional doctrine;70 it is also instrumentalist, premised on the theory 
that because some originalist conclusions will be “unappealing” today, they 
should be ignored.71  Paul Brest attempted to buttress this claim by arguing 
that “[t]he drafting, adopting, or amending of the Constitution may itself 
have suffered from defects of democratic process which detract from its 
moral claims.”72 
Recognizing the force of both the defenses and criticisms of 
originalism, several commentators have attempted to accommodate or 
reconcile originalism and nonoriginalism.  One ambitious effort has been 
Lawrence Lessig’s work on fidelity and translation.73  Lessig argued that 
“[w]hile originalists sometimes say that we must apply the principles of the 
Framers and Ratifiers to the circumstances of today, they more often behave 
as if the question were simply (and always), ‘How would the originals have 
answered this question then?’”74 This approach fails, he argued, because 
“although sensitive to the effects of context upon meaning in the original 
context, it is blind to the effects of context upon the application [of] 
meaning in the application context.”75  The better approach, he suggested, is 
fidelity through translation, which aims to “preserve original meaning, not 
just in the original context but as applied in the current context.”76  Many self-
                                                                                                                            
 68. Munzer & Nickel, supra note 59, at 1032. 
 69. Farber, supra note 67, at 1095. 
 70. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11–22 (1991); Dorf, supra 
note 49, at 1788; Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 
710–714 (1975); see also Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 227 (1988) (“Most observers agree 
that a substantial portion of constitutional law is only tenuously connected to the Constitution of 
1787–89, as amended.”). 
 71. Munzer & Nickel, supra note 59, at 1033. 
 72. Brest, supra note 58, at 230.  For direct responses to the principal critiques of 
originalism, see Kay, supra note 70. 
 73. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) [hereinafter 
Lessig, Fidelity]; Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. 
REV. 125; Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
395 (1995). 
 74. Lessig, Fidelity, supra note 73, at 1171 (footnotes omitted).  Lessig refers to this 
approach as “one-step” fidelity. 
 75. Id. at 1189. 
 76. Id.; see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); Clinton, 
supra note 42, at 1278–79 (arguing that “[e]xtraconstitutional interpretation [sometimes] 
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described originalists, including Justice Scalia, have on occasion followed 
this approach.77 
“The debate over originalism is almost as old as our current 
constitutional Union.”78  From the period immediately following ratification 
through the mid-nineteenth century, originalism was the principal, 
although not exclusive, mode of constitutional interpretation. “The Court’s 
very early constitutional opinions reflected an intimate knowledge of the 
Framers’ design because the Justices’ own memories bridged the temporal 
distance between the Founding and the case at hand”;79 indeed, Chief 
Justice John Marshall had played a crucial role at the Virginia ratification 
convention.  Originalism did not formally come under attack until the 
Civil War,80 which precipitated the ratification of constitutional 
amendments that seemed to alter substantially the original balance between 
federal and state authority.81  The notion that the Constitution’s meaning 
could evolve competed with originalism for the Court’s devotion during the 
period between Reconstruction and the New Deal.82  After the New Deal, 
the Warren Court was alternately accused of ignoring the original meaning 
of the Constitution83 and of relying on but distorting it.84  The Warren 
                                                                                                                            
facilitates evolution at a minimal cost to constitutional stability,” and that “interpretations of the 
document that are fundamentally at odds with the historic meaning of those who drafted 
it . . . ultimately undermine societal faith in constitutional governance and judicial review, 
suggesting that in appropriate cases the demonstrated original understandings of the Constitution 
must be controlling”); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1998) (“True fidelity to the Constitution requires that we be faithful to what 
history reveals as this generation’s deepest, most enduring commitments, not just those of the 
founding generation.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 886 (2003) (arguing that theories of interpretation should be informed by 
the “institutional capacities” of the interpreter and the “dynamic effects” of the interpretation). 
 77. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40  (2001) (holding that the use of a 
thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of 
heat within the home constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); id. 
at 33–34 (“It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”); id. at 40 (“[W]e 
must take the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment forward.”). 
 78. Clinton, supra note 42, at 1180. 
 79. Friedman & Smith, supra note 76, at 11. 
 80. See SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 55 (1862).  The 
purported originalism of the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), 
could not have helped the cause of originalism. 
 81. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 150 (1890). 
 82. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), and United States v. Butler, 297 
U.S. 1 (1936), and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (originalist), with Home Bldg. 
& Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934), and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 
(nonoriginalist). 
 83. See Rehnquist, supra note 28, at 702–03. 
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Court’s perceived excesses led to the rise of the modern originalists, and the 
debate over originalism dominated not only the academic literature but also 
political debates over judicial nominations in the 1980s.85 
The debate over originalism continues in the academy, but on the 
Court the originalists have prevailed, at least in federalism cases.  The 
Printz decision is not unusual in the degree to which the debate between 
the majority and the dissent focused on the original understanding.86  
Dissenting Justices have from time to time suggested other methods of 
identifying the boundaries between federal and state power,87 but on the 
whole, the debate in the Court’s most recent federalism cases has been 
waged on originalist terms. 
What, then, explains the persistent disagreement in federalism cases 
between the majority and the dissent?  It is no great revelation to suggest 
that the majority and the dissent have profoundly different views of the 
original understanding of federalism.  What I demonstrate below is that in 
their respective attempts to discern the original understanding, the majority 
and dissenting Justices consistently rely on different—indeed, conflicting—
views from the framing era.  In order to appreciate this, it is necessary first 
to have an understanding of those conflicting views.  Therefore, before 
providing the results of the study and offering some thoughts about the 
study’s implications for originalism, I provide a brief historical overview of 
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.  Sadly, it is not possible to 
provide a suitably nuanced and thorough account of the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution in a discussion that, like this one, is 
necessarily brief; for such a treatment, the reader must look elsewhere.88 
II.   UNDERSTANDING THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
A. Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
Broadly speaking, the drafting of the Constitution and the subsequent 
battle over its ratification created two opposing camps: the Federalists and 
                                                                                                                            
 84. See Kelly, supra note 61, at 136. 
 85. See BORK, supra note 34, at 295–321. 
 86. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); id. at 760–814 (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); id. at 76–100 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 100–
85 (Souter, J., dissenting); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); id. at 845–
926 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 87. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976–77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(discussing European views of federalism). 
 88. For a delightfully nuanced account, see RAKOVE, supra note 32. 
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the Anti-Federalists.89  Of course, to divide neatly into two camps those 
from the founding era who had strong views about the Constitution is to 
oversimplify history.  Some of the Federalists, for example, wanted to 
abolish the states,90 while others believed that the proposed Constitution’s 
national government was too strong and should be limited in authority by 
subsequent amendment.91  Likewise, some Anti-Federalists agreed that the 
Articles of Confederation should be reformed to give Congress more 
authority,92 while others feared any further consolidation of authority.  
Although it is difficult to generalize at the margins, the principal question 
that reliably divided the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists was whether to 
adopt the new Constitution: the Federalists supported ratification, the 
Anti-Federalists opposed it. 
The Anti-Federalists have come to be defined more by what they were 
against than what they were for; and they were “against the Constitution.”93  
However, “[b]y definition, an Anti-federalist was anyone who opposed the 
ratification of the Constitution, and the word therefore included some who 
would have been satisfied with a few changes in the new plan and those 
who would not accept it under any conditions.”94 
Although the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists are known 
principally for their efforts for and against the ratification of the 
Constitution, their respective views crystallized some years earlier.  The 
project of creating a new Constitution, after all, was largely a reaction to 
the palpable defects of the Articles of Confederation.  Under the Articles, 
Congress did not have a general power of taxation; instead, to raise revenue 
it had to requisition funds from the states, whose duty of compliance merely 
was one of good faith.  Congress also lacked the power to regulate 
commerce among the states.  And although the power to enter treaties and 
to “determin[e] on peace and war” were committed to “the United States, 
                                                                                                                            
 89. The label given to the Anti-Federalists in the literature has not been uniform.  Herbert 
Storing explained: “‘Anti-Federalist’ balances the positive and negative sides by giving the group 
(or the position) a proper name, while still emphasizing its character as opposition.  The 
typographically convenient ‘Antifederalist,’ now generally in favor, suggests more cohesion than 
actually existed, while ‘anti-Federalist’ suggests a merely negative, dependent unity.”  HERBERT J. 
STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 79 n.6 (1981).  Like Professor Storing, this 
Article refers to the group as the “Anti-Federalists.” 
 90. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 
525 (1969). 
 91. See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1781–1788, at 119 (1961). 
 92. See STORING, supra note 89, at 24–25. 
 93. Id. at 5. 
 94. MAIN, supra note 91, at 119. 
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in Congress assembled,”95 Congress’s power to conduct foreign affairs was 
seriously impaired by its lack of direct authority over the states.96  There is 
serious debate over whether the states under the Confederation were truly 
sovereign and independent,97 but there is little doubt that under the 
Articles Congress was largely impotent to accomplish the shared objectives 
of the Confederacy. 
Before the idea of replacing the Articles with a charter that gave more 
power to the national government gained currency, Congress sought to 
address some of the defects of the Articles and, in so doing, to find a cure 
for the substantial debt with which it was saddled.  Shortly before the 
Articles had even taken effect, Congress proposed an amendment 
authorizing it to impose an impost on imported goods to raise revenue.  
When that measure failed to achieve unanimous support among the states, 
Congress again proposed an impost, this time as part of a compromise 
package that included inducements for the unwilling states.98  Although 
Congress desperately needed a means other than requisition for raising 
revenue in order to conduct the business of the confederacy, the larger 
import of the proposal was not lost on supporters of the general allocation 
of authority under the Articles.  “The immediate effect of the impost would 
have been to confer a limited power of taxation upon Congress.”99  Not too 
many years before, the colonists had fought a revolution over perceived 
                                                                                                                            
 95. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 2 (1781). 
 96. Several states attempted to carry on their own diplomatic relations with foreign 
nations, even though such actions were prohibited by the Articles.  See WOOD, supra note 90, at 
356–57; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1448 (1987) 
(arguing that in practice the United States under the Articles of Confederation “was not much 
more than the ‘United Nations’ is in 1987: a mutual treaty conveniently dishonored on all sides”). 
 97. Compare WOOD, supra note 90, at 357 (“The Confederation was intended to be, and 
remained, a Confederation of sovereign states.”), and James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme 
Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 584 (1994) (“During the 
period that preceded the framing, the states regarded themselves and one another as sovereign 
states within the meaning of the law of nations . . . .”), with SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A 
NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 192–94, 235–36 (1993) (arguing that, 
given the states’ lack of authority over foreign affairs, the states were not sovereign), Nelson, supra 
note 33, at 1576 (“[T]he [thirteen] individual states were not exactly thirteen separate 
countries.”), and Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 1031, 1043 (1997) (arguing that under the Articles of Confederation, the states were not 
“nation-states in the conventional sense, fully empowered to confront the nations of Europe as 
equal sovereigns”). 
 98. See RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 25.  In addition to an impost, the revenue plan of April 
18, 1783 included a proposed revision in the method of “apportioning national expenses among 
the states.”  See id. 
 99. MAIN, supra note 91, at 72. 
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abuse of the power of taxation, and the proposed impost revived fears of a 
distant government aggrandizing itself with its power to tax. 
By 1786 all of the states had accepted the impost, but disagreements 
over how to collect the tax led to the measure’s failure.  According to one 
account, the impost ultimately failed because it ran counter to the 
commercial interests of some states such as Rhode Island, which imported 
and exported quite heavily.100  But opposition to the impost was in some 
quarters as much political as economic; “[i]t was not money, but power, that 
mattered most.”101  Democritus, summing up the prevailing view of the 
impost’s opponents, wrote, “power, among people civilized as we are, is 
necessarily connected with the direction of the public money.”102  The 
Virginia legislature declared that granting the power to tax to a body other 
than itself would be “injurious to its sovereignty, may prove destructive of 
the rights and liberty of the people, and . . . is contravening the spirit of the 
confederation.”103 
The arguments in favor of the impost (that Congress needed the power 
to raise revenue in order to conduct the business of the confederacy, as 
opposed to the business of the individual states) and those wielded against 
it (that conferral of such a power on the Congress would lead to the 
evisceration of state sovereignty) “were soon to be employed in a greater 
debate.”104  The opponents of the impost were not yet known by the term 
“Anti-Federalists”—indeed, in opposing alteration of the basic allocation of 
authority in the confederacy, they were pro-federal—but their position 
against a consolidation of powers in Congress ultimately would form the 
basis of what came to be known as the Anti-Federalist view.  These 
fledgling Anti-Federalists did not oppose every reform of the Articles of 
                                                                                                                            
 100. Id. at 77; accord WOOD, supra note 90, at 488 (“[The debate over the impost] possessed 
a political and social significance that transcended economic concerns.”). 
 101. MAIN, supra note 91, at 77. 
 102. FREEMAN’S JOURNAL (Phila.), Mar. 26, 1783, at 1; PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, May 3, 
1783 (quoted in MAIN, supra note 91, at 79). 
 103. Act of October 1782, ch. XLII, reprinted in STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 171 (William 
Waller Hening ed., 1823), quoted in MAIN, supra note 91, at 80. 
 104. MAIN, supra note 91, at 102; accord THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST, at xii (W.B. 
Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds., 2d ed. 2002) (Each side in the debate over the ratification of the 
Constitution “was known by the reputation which it had earned in the struggles of the 1770s and 
1780s” over strengthening the Union, rather than in terms of the principles which they 
articulated in the post-convention struggle.).  The battle over the impost, which took place, off 
and on, over a five-year period, is emblematic of the competing views although it was not the only 
issue that revealed broad opposition to expanded congressional power.  The same debate was 
waged over proposals to grant pensions for life to military officers who remained in the service for 
the war’s duration and to grant Congress power to regulate trade.  See MAIN, supra note 91, at 
106–13.   
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Confederation—many supported granting more power to Congress over 
commerce and foreign affairs—but in general they supported only those 
proposals that would leave unchanged the basic structure the Articles, 
which preserved the states as largely sovereign entities.105 
In 1786, on the heels of the impost debate, the Annapolis Convention 
ended without achieving its immediate goal of reforming the Articles of 
Confederation, but produced a call for a general convention in Philadelphia 
the following May.  Unlike the opponents of the impost, many of the 
supporters of the effort to reform the Articles believed that the source of the 
problems confronting the nation was not only the impotence of the 
national government, but also the parochialism and obstructionism of the 
states.106  It is familiar history that James Madison seized the initiative early, 
bringing to the Convention a blueprint for a strong national government.107  
He found a relatively receptive audience; few delegates to the Convention 
had been openly opposed to a greater consolidation of authority.108 
That is not to say that the proposal for a more consolidated national 
government was without resistance, and the story of the Convention is one 
of repeated compromise.  The most substantive proposal associated with the 
Anti-Federal bloc at the Convention was the New Jersey Plan, which was 
intended as an alternative to Randolph’s Virginia Plan.  The nationalistic 
Virginia Plan included a broad statement of powers to be vested in the 
national legislature; a national veto over state laws “contravening . . . the 
articles of Union”; the right of the national government “to call forth the 
force of the Union [against] any member . . . failing to fulfill its duty”; the 
establishment of an independent executive and judiciary, which would be 
joined in a council of revision; and a bicameral legislature with suffrage “to 
be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to the number of free 
inhabitants.”109  The New Jersey Plan, in contrast, was more of a 
modification to the Articles of Confederation than a new structure of 
                                                                                                                            
 105. See STORING, supra note 89, at 24–25. 
 106. See RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 47. 
 107. See, e.g., id. at 35–56. 
 108. The delegates associated with Anti-Federalist thought were George Mason of Virginia, 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, John Lansing and Robert Yates of New York, and John Mercer 
and Luther Martin of Virginia.  Rhode Island, where opposition to consolidation was strong, did 
not send delegates to the Convention.  Edmund Randolph of Virginia, who drafted the 
nationalistic Virginia Plan but then refused to sign the final draft of the Constitution, “began and 
ended as a Federalist with a brief Antifederal stage in between.”  MAIN, supra note 91, at 116; 
accord RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 134. 
 109. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20–21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1937). 
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government.110  In relevant part, the New Jersey Plan proposed a unicameral 
Congress in which each state would be equally represented, and an 
expansion of Congress’s existing powers to include the authority to impose 
an impost and to regulate foreign and interstate trade.111  The New Jersey 
Plan was as much the work of delegates from small states, which feared the 
dilution of their influence in the union, as it was the work of Anti-
Federalists, who resisted centralization of authority as a matter of principle.  
But the Plan was consistent with Anti-Federal views “in that the Articles 
were retained as the fundamental basis of government.”112 
After the defeat of the New Jersey Plan, several Anti-Federalists—
John Lansing, Robert Yates, and John Mercer—withdrew from the 
Convention.  In addition, Elbridge Gerry, George Mason, and Luther 
Martin feared that the proposed Constitution was not sufficiently 
democratic, and they refused to sign the final proposal.  It probably goes too 
far to argue, as has Jackson T. Main, that  “[t]he Constitution did not, 
therefore, represent the views or the influence even of the moderate [Anti-
Federalists], to say nothing of the majority”;113 even with the failure of the 
New Jersey Plan, the Constitution transmitted to Congress and sent to the 
states for ratification was not a complete victory for the nationalists.  The 
Connecticut Compromise rejected the Virginia Plan’s formula for 
representation in the Senate (which was to be based on wealth or 
population) and instead provided for the equal representation of the states.  
Delegates also rejected Madison’s proposal of a congressional power to 
negate state laws (and a proposal to authorize coercive military force to 
resolve conflicts between state and federal law), preferring instead 
contingent supremacy for federal statutes.114  Although important, these 
limitations on federal authority did not appease the Anti-Federalists’ 
concerns. 
                                                                                                                            
 110. Id. at 242 (proposing “that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, 
corrected & enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigences [sic] of 
Government, & the preservation of the Union.”). 
 111. Id. at 242–45. 
 112. MAIN, supra note 91, at 117. 
 113. Id. at 117–18. 
 114. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on 
Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 99 (2003) (explaining that the Supremacy Clause 
requires resolution of conflicts between federal and state law in favor of federal law only when the 
federal law has been validly enacted). 
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Despite the many points of disagreement among Anti-Federalists, their 
unifying position was opposition to the ratification of the Constitution.  
Two basic and fundamental beliefs animated their opposition: first, Anti-
Federalists opposed the consolidation of authority in a central government, 
and believed in the primacy of the states; and second, Anti-Federalists 
believed fervently in egalitarian, democratic government.  Not all Anti-
Federalists subscribed to both views; the preference for a weak central 
government typically was more pronounced among the wealthier, large 
planters, who thought that liberty should be emphasized over authority, and 
the belief in democratic control was more associated with small farmers, 
who “wanted a government dominated by the many rather than the few.”115  
On the whole, these two beliefs—aversion to consolidation of authority and 
support for democratic government—formed the basis of the Anti-
Federalist attack on the Constitution. 
These two ingredients of the Anti-Federalist position were, of course, 
closely related.  As Gordon Wood has explained: 
[T]he Antifederalists’ lack of faith was not in the people themselves, 
but only in the organizations and institutions that presumed to speak 
for the people. . .  .  They were “localists,” fearful of distant 
governmental, even representational, authority for very significant 
political and social reasons that in the final analysis must be called 
democratic.116 
The Anti-Federalists’ unifying theory stemmed from the belief “that a free 
elective government cannot be extended over large territories.”117  Robert 
Yates, writing as “Brutus,” argued that “a free republic cannot succeed over 
                                                                                                                            
 115. MAIN, supra note 91, at xiv.  Although in general the democrats “accepted the 
doctrine of weak government,” the “advocates of weak government did not always believe in 
democracy.”  Id.  Professor Main argued that the divide between Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
mirrored the divide “between the commercial and non-commercial elements in the population.”  
MAIN, supra note 91, at 280.  He further explained: 
Federalists dominated the towns and the rich valleys, they included most of the public 
and private creditors, great landowners, lawyers and judges, manufacturers and 
shipowners, higher ranking civil and military officials, and college graduates.  Although 
the Antifederalists derived their leadership from such men, the rank and file were men of 
moderate means, with little social prestige, farmers often in debt, obscure men for the 
most part. 
Id. at 280–81. 
 116. WOOD, supra note 90, at 520. 
 117. OBSERVATIONS LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
PROPOSED BY THE LATER CONVENTION; AND TO SEVERAL AND NECESSARY ALTERATIONS IN 
IT.  IN A NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN [hereinafter 
LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER], reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 223, 
¶ 2.8.14, at 230 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (letter of Oct. 8, 1787). 
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a country of such immense extent, containing such a number of 
inhabitants, and these encreasing in such rapid progression as that of the 
whole United States.”118  A small republic, in the Anti-Federalist view, was 
the only unit that could ensure the voluntary attachment of the people to 
the government, and the responsibility and accountability of the 
government to the people.  As The Federal Farmer argued,  
[t]he great object of a free people must be so to form their 
government and laws, and so to administer them, as to create a 
confidence in, and respect for the laws; and thereby induce the 
sensible and virtuous part of the community to declare in favor of the 
laws, and to support them without an expensive military force.119 
In a smaller republic, the people would have “knowledge of those who 
govern” and would accordingly submit more readily to governmental 
authority.120  Smaller republics, moreover, were more likely to have 
homogeneous populations; because diversity would inevitably lead to laws 
that favor some groups over others, friction was more likely in larger 
societies and less likely in smaller ones. 
Similarly, the Anti-Federalists believed that representative 
government could be responsible to the people only if the republic were 
small enough that the representatives would be directly answerable to the 
people.  In small republics, elected representatives would “be a true picture 
of the people; possess the knowledge of their circumstances and their wants; 
sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true 
interests.”121  But in a large republic—like the proposed United States—the 
ratio of constituents to representatives would be so large that accountability 
would be lost.122  That, in the view of the Anti-Federalists, was a recipe for 
tyranny. 
To the Anti-Federalists, a strong central government would 
desperately lack the democratic virtues of the states.  Only representative 
government in smaller units—such as the existing states from the 
                                                                                                                            
 118. BRUTUS, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 117, at 363, ¶ 2.9.11, at 368. 
 119. LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 117, at 234, 234 (letter of Oct. 10, 
1787). 
 120. STORING, supra note 89, at 17 (quoting THE LETTERS OF RICHARD HENRY LEE 464 
(James C. Ballagh ed., 1911–1914)). 
 121. SPEECH BY MELANCTON SMITH AT THE CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (June 21, 1788), reprinted in 6 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 117, at 155, 157. 
 122. See, e.g., LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER, supra note 117, at 294, 300 (letter of 
Jan. 12, 1788). 
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Confederation—would preserve these benefits.  As a result, Anti-Federalists 
believed first and foremost in the primacy of the states, a position the states 
enjoyed under the Articles of Confederation.  The Anti-Federalists found 
the proposed Constitution rife with indications of the demise of the states 
as the primary locus of sovereignty.  The national government would have 
the power to tax; the Necessary and Proper Clause made the other powers 
seem that much more expansive; and the Supremacy Clause was the 
smoking gun.  Even the elegant phrasing of the Preamble, speaking with the 
voice of “We, the People,” convinced many, including Patrick Henry, that 
the Constitution intended the dilution of the states’ authority: 
[W]hat right had they to say, We, the People[?]  My political curiosity, 
exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to 
ask who authorised them to speak the language of, We, the People, 
instead of We, the States?  States are the characteristics, and the soul 
of a confederation.  If the States be not the agents of this compact, it 
must be one great consolidated National Government of the people 
of all the States.123 
Likewise, the procedure in Article VII of the Constitution, which provided 
that “[t]he ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient 
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying 
the Same,”124 was flatly inconsistent with the requirement of unanimous 
consent for constitutional changes under the Articles of Confederation.125  
This was too much for some Anti-Federalists to swallow.126 
The Anti-Federalist alternative to consolidation was preservation 
(perhaps with modifications) of a confederation in which the states 
remained the primary sovereigns.  “The defense of the federal character of 
the American union [under the Articles of Confederation] was the most 
prominent article of Anti-Federalist conservative doctrine.”127  In this sense, 
the Anti-Federalists (as they came to be known) were in fact the true 
“federalists.”  They stood for federalism—that is, a confederation of equal 
and largely independent states—“in opposition to what they called the 
consolidating tendency and intention of the Constitution—the tendency to 
                                                                                                                            
 123. SPEECH OF PATRICK HENRY IN THE VIRGINIA RATIFYING CONVENTION (June 4, 
1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 117, at 209, 211; see also 
LETTER OF SAMUEL ADAMS TO RICHARD HENRY LEE (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE 
WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 324 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1908) (“[A]s I enter the Building 
I stumble at the Threshold.”). 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 125. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1781). 
 126. See STORING, supra note 89, at 12–14. 
 127. Id. at 9. 
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establish one complete national government, which would destroy or 
undermine the states.”128 
Whether one views the label “Anti-Federalist” as the “penalty of 
defeat”129 or instead as a fair but effective exploitation of the term by 
supporters of the Constitution,130 the indisputable point is that the 
Federalists supported the Constitution principally because they believed 
that it created a stronger, more consolidated national government, and the 
Anti-Federalists opposed it for the same reason.  The record suggests that 
the Anti-Federalists were correct to suspect that the Federalists hoped “to 
prostrate all the State legislatures [and] form a general system out of the 
whole.”131  Indeed, at the Philadelphia convention Edmund Randolph 
“candidly confessed” that he proposed the Virginia Plan not because he 
wanted to create a “federal government,” but because he wanted to create 
“a strong consolidated union, in which the idea of states should be nearly 
annihilated.”132  Similarly, Gouverneur Morris explained that the Plan 
envisioned a “national, supreme, Government,” based on the principle “that 
in all communities there must be one supreme power, and one only.”133  
James Madison (joined by James Wilson) strongly opposed equal 
representation of the states in the Senate and elimination of the negative 
on state laws because they hoped to “deny any recognition of state 
sovereignty in the Constitution, and thus prevent a reversion to the evils of 
the Confederacy.”134 
Madison also disagreed with the principal Anti-Federalist premise.  
Small states with homogeneous populations were not the solution to the 
problems confronting the Confederation, he believed, but rather were the 
                                                                                                                            
 128. Id. at 10.  One can be forgiven for wondering at this point why, if the Anti-Federalists 
supported the confederation and opposed the Constitution because of its consolidating (and 
therefore anti-federal) tendencies, they are not known by the label “Federalists.”  One account is 
that the label, “far from being their own choice, was imposed upon them by their opponents,” to 
imply that the Anti-Federalists “were mere obstructionists, without any positive plan to offer.”  
MAIN, supra note 91, at xi.  The other account is that the term “federal” enjoyed a certain 
ambiguity at the time.  When the Articles of Confederation was the governing charter, the term 
was often used (by supporters and detractors alike) to describe the “instrumentality of the 
federation per se”—that, is the general government and Congress—and a person was “federal” if 
he demonstrated willingness “to strengthen or support the institutions of the federation.”  
STORING, supra note 89, at 9. 
 129. MAIN, supra note 91, at xi. 
 130. STORING, supra note 89, at 10. 
 131. LETTER OF WILLIAM GRAYSON TO JAMES MONROE (May 29, 1787), reprinted in 3 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 109, at 30. 
 132. 1 id. at 24. 
 133. Id. at 34. 
 134. WOOD, supra note 90, at 525–26. 
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source of the problem.  In the small republic, Madison argued, there was 
significant risk that popular majorities, united by “an apparent interest or 
common passion,” would work “unjust violations of the rights and interests 
of the minority, or of individuals.”135  But “enlargement of the sphere” of the 
republic would cure this defect of small-scale democracy “because a 
common interest or passion is less apt to be felt and the requisite 
combinations less easy to be formed by a great than a small number.”136  
Factions, in other words, would “check each other, whilst those who may 
feel a common sentiment have less opportunity of communication and 
concert.”137 
Madison’s theory of faction also was responsive to the second principal 
Anti-Federalist critique of the proposed Constitution: that the charter was 
not sufficiently democratic.  As Gordon Wood has explained, the Anti-
Federalists were “true champions of the most extreme kind of democratic 
and egalitarian politics expressed in the Revolutionary era.”  They “believed 
that popular government itself, as defined by the principles of 1776, was 
endangered by the new national government.”138  Indeed, although 
generally not oblivious to the risks of majoritarian oppression, several 
prominent Anti-Federalists seemed to have expressed the view that 
majoritarian rule by definition cannot be tyrannical.139  The Constitution, 
they believed, at best would create a government by aristocracy. 
Federalists did not exactly disagree with this characterization; this is 
evident from their response to Anti-Federalist claims that the voluntary 
attachment of the people to their government was possible only in small 
republics.  Alexander Hamilton argued that such loyalty would remain only 
as long as the state governments were administered well, and that the 
federal government would command similar loyalty if it were better 
administered.140  Hamilton likely thought that the federal government 
would be better administered, in large part because “the extension of the 
spheres of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the 
                                                                                                                            
 135. JAMES MADISON, VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, reprinted in 9 PAPERS OF 
MADISON 351–57 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975), quoted in RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 50. 
 136. Id. at 356–57. 
 137. Id. at 357; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 138. WOOD, supra note 90, at 516. 
 139. See, e.g., SPEECH BY GEORGE CLINTON BEFORE THE NEW YORK STATE RATIFYING 
CONVENTION (June 27, 1788), reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 117, 
at 178, 178 (stating that “the will of the people . . . is the law”); BRUTUS TO THE CITIZENS OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 117, at 382, 383 (arguing that only way to avoid tyrannical government is to have “an equal, 
full and fair representation”). 
 140. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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people.”141  Federalists believed that this “elitist theory of democracy” would 
save popular government and the Revolution “from their excesses.”142  The 
debate over ratification thus pitted largely irreconcilable positions against 
each other.  “What Brutus saw as the great defect of the 
Constitution . . . Madison and others saw as its greatest virtue.”143 
But the debate was just that—a debate—and Federalist supporters of 
the Constitution set out not simply to demonstrate what they viewed as the 
shortcomings of Anti-Federalist theory, but also to cast the proposed 
Constitution in the light most likely to alleviate some of the more 
damaging Anti-Federalist critiques.  Indeed, although most Federalists were 
convinced that the Constitution’s provision for a strong central 
government was the appropriate cure for the Confederacy’s ills, Anti-
Federalist concerns resonated among broad sections of the population.144  
Accordingly, the battle waged over ratification in the press and at the state 
conventions was quintessentially political, characterized by defenses and 
attacks that were alternately genuine, hyperbolic, and obfuscatory. 
During the ratification debates, Anti-Federalists began to shift the 
focus of their attack.  Perhaps recognizing the force of the Federalist 
argument that the main defect of the Articles of Confederation was the 
weakness of its central government, Anti-Federalists increasingly focused 
on the need for a bill of rights to limit the power of the national 
government.  “[I]n forming a government on its true principles,” Brutus 
argued, “the foundation should be laid . . . by expressly reserving to the 
people such of their essential natural rights, as are not necessary to be 
parted with.”145  It had been an article of faith among Anti-Federalists that a 
truly federal government required no bill of rights, because under such an 
arrangement the central government’s powers (and thus power to do harm 
to individual liberties) would be strictly circumscribed;146 indeed, the 
Articles of Confederation contained no explicit protection for individual 
rights.  Therefore, by arguing for a bill of rights, the Anti-Federalists 
conceded that the Constitution (as submitted for ratification) would create 
                                                                                                                            
 141. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 142. WOOD, supra note 90, at 517. 
 143. STORING, supra note 89, at 47. 
 144. For a detailed discussion of Anti-Federalist support during the ratification debates, see 
MAIN, supra note 91, at 187–248. 
 145. BRUTUS, TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Nov. 1, 1787), reprinted in 2 
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 117, at 372, 373. 
 146. See, e.g., NEW HAMPSHIRE FREEMAN’S ORACLE (Jan. 18, 1788), quoted in STORING, 
supra note 89, at 65 & n.8. 
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a strong national government.  “[I]n making this reply the Anti-Federalists 
decisively abandoned the doctrine of strict federalism.”147 
This does not suggest that the Federalists unabashedly asserted during 
the ratification debates that the Constitution created an unambiguously 
strong national government that would lead to the eventual evisceration of 
the states.  On the contrary, although many prominent Federalists had 
expressed their view during the Philadelphia convention that the national 
government should be unapologetically strong,148 during the ratification 
debates Federalists tended to coopt the language of their Anti-Federalist 
critics, arguing that the Constitution adequately delineated the respective 
spheres of the national and state governments and preserved significant 
authority to the states.  For example, in a famous speech in front of the 
Pennsylvania statehouse, James Wilson argued that the Constitution did 
not require a bill of rights because the national government could exercise 
only those powers delegated by “positive grant expressed in the instrument 
of the union.”149  The argument that the national government’s powers were 
limited to those enumerated implied not only that a bill of rights was 
unnecessary, but also that the states retained all powers not delegated to the 
national government.  Similar arguments appear in Federalist writings in 
support of ratification.150  Given their statements at the Philadelphia 
convention and in other sources, however, there is little doubt that most 
prominent Federalists hoped to circumscribe state authority more severely 
than their polemics let on.151 
In the end, the states ratified the Constitution, but several state 
ratification conventions gave voice to Anti-Federalist suggestions by 
proposing amendments to the new Constitution; two years later, the states 
ratified the Bill of Rights.  It risks oversimplification to talk about who 
                                                                                                                            
 147. STORING, supra note 89, at 65. 
 148. See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text. 
 149. JAMES WILSON, SPEECH AT A PUBLIC MEETING IN PHILADELPHIA (Oct. 6, 1787), 
reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 337, 
339 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
 150. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those which are to remain 
in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.”). 
 151. According to historian Jackson T. Main:  
The Federalists met this attack by an attempt to deny the accusation in public, but it 
seems from their private statements that they intended to create a national government, 
although prevailing opinion obliged them to compromise.  The records of the debates in 
the Philadelphia Convention are convincing evidence of this intention; the real 
convictions of the Federalist delegates can also be discovered in letters and journals. 
MAIN, supra note 91, at 121 ; see also RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 142–51; STORING, supra note 89, 
at 38; WOOD, supra note 90, at 525–26. 
Sources of Federalism 31 
 
52:1 Smith Smith Pages 2.doc (8/24/2004 9:20 AM) 
“won” the debate over the Constitution, but Herbert Storing’s summary is 
relatively uncontroversial: 
While the Federalists gave us the Constitution, . . . the legacy of the 
Anti-Federalists was the Bill of Rights.  But it is an ambiguous legacy, 
as can be seen by studying the debate.  Indeed, in one sense, the 
success of the Bill of Rights reflects the failure of the Anti-
Federalists.  The whole emphasis on reservations of rights of 
individuals implied a fundamental acceptance of the “consolidated” 
character of the new government.152 
Even if one accepts (as I think one must) that the Federalists “won”—at 
least in the narrow sense that the Constitution, which they supported, was 
ratified—the original meaning of the document, particularly with respect to 
specific questions unanswered by the text, is far from obvious, and the 
difficulties in determining a single original meaning stem from the very 
nature of the debate over the document’s drafting and ratification. 
B. Methodological Difficulties 
As explained above,153 whether it is appropriate to seek the original 
understanding of the Constitution to answer modern questions of 
constitutional law is a highly controversial question in its own right.  With 
respect to questions of federalism, however, the members of the Court seem 
to agree that originalism is the appropriate methodology.  Therefore, 
assuming that the original understanding ought to be accorded dispositive 
weight, one needs a means of determining what precisely the original 
understanding was.  Here the disagreement begins. 
Originalism’s most ardent defenders readily point out that “it is often 
exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient 
text . . . a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer.”154  
This is true, Justice Scalia has noted, because seeking the original 
understanding 
                                                                                                                            
 152. STORING, supra note 89, at 65; see also THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 
104, at xiv–xv (“Although the Federalists won the debate, they did not get everything that they 
desired.  Antifederalist political theory entered the very nature of the American system, for 
example, by virtue of its inclusion in the Constitution itself.”). 
 153. See supra notes 58–72 and accompanying text. 
 154. Scalia, supra note 24, at 856–57; see also BORK, supra note 34, at 163 (acknowledging 
that “two judges equally devoted to the original purpose may disagree about the reach or 
application of the principle at stake and so arrive at different results, but that in no way 
distinguishes the task from the difficulties of applying any other legal writing.”). 
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requires the consideration of an enormous mass of material—in the 
case of the Constitution and its Amendments, for example, to 
mention only one element, the records of the ratifying debates in all 
the states.  Even beyond that, it requires an evaluation of the 
reliability of that material . . . . And further still, it requires 
immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the 
time—somehow placing out of mind knowledge that we have which 
an earlier age did not, and putting on beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, 
prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our day.155 
Justice Scalia is surely correct, and his concession brooks no dissent from 
critics of originalism.  But the Court’s actual pattern of decision suggests 
that the task of seeking the original understanding is terribly complicated 
for a more fundamental reason, one that stems in large part from the nature 
of the founding. 
As Part II.A makes clear, the framing and ratification debates vented 
competing views of the most fundamental constitutional issues: sovereignty, 
democracy, republicanism, and federalism, to name only the most 
prominent.  Although it is easy to forget from our vantage point, the debate 
over the Constitution was political, in the best and worst senses of the term.  
Anti-Federalists sometimes acknowledged the need for constitutional 
reform,156 and other times described the Constitution’s provisions in wildly 
hyperbolic terms in attempts to hasten its demise.157  Likewise, Federalists 
expressed bold interpretations of the Constitution in some fora158—
preaching to the choir, if you will—and offered more temperate readings in 
others to cajole and persuade opponents and the undecided to support 
ratification.159 
To take the most prominent example, although The Federalist—cited 
regularly by both the federalism majority and dissent on the current Court 
                                                                                                                            
 155. Scalia, supra note 24, at 856–57. 
 156. See MAIN, supra note 91, at 255; STORING, supra note 89, at 24–25. 
 157. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 147 (Anti-Federalist “polemics often drifted off into 
implausible predictions of tyranny lurking in obscure clauses”). 
 158. See supra notes 132–151 and accompanying text. 
 159. As Alpheus Mason explained:  
To quiet the fears of opponents, advocates of ratification said things which, in later years, 
proved embarrassing to themselves and misleading to scholars.  On the other hand, 
certain of the Constitution’s enemies turned alarmist, portraying the proposed national 
charter in the most extreme terms.  The strategy obscured positions on all sides and made 
the Constitution’s meaning less than crystal clear. 
Alpheus T. Mason, The Federalist—A Split Personality, in ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 163, 168 (John P. Roche ed., 1967); see also RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 149–55. 
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to ascertain the original understanding160—has obvious significance as a 
“detailed, contemporaneous exposition of the Constitution by authors who 
were intimately familiar with its legal and political background,” it “is 
nonetheless a piece of political advocacy, whose contents may at times 
reflect the exigencies of debate, rather than a dispassionate account of 
constitutional meaning.”161  Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John 
Jay shared responsibility for authoring the Federalist Papers, which they 
wrote principally to support the campaign for ratification in New York.162  
As John Manning has observed, far from being “a neutral observer’s 
detached exposition of constitutional meaning,” The Federalist was “merely 
an exercise in political persuasion.”163  As an analysis of and justification for 
the Constitution’s provisions, The Federalist is an indispensable resource; as 
evidence of the original understanding it is suspect because of its obvious 
strategic objectives.164 
The difficulties of seeking the original meaning go beyond the taint of 
tactical politics one finds on much of the evidence of the original 
understanding.  Should ratification be understood as an implicit rejection of 
Anti-Federalist concerns?  Or did the state conventions ratify the 
Constitution only because of Federalist assurances that the Constitution in 
fact addressed the Anti-Federalists’ concerns?  Although the Justices on the 
current Court rarely acknowledge their positions expressly, the study 
described below demonstrates that the majority answers the latter question 
in the affirmative, whereas the dissent answers the former in the 
affirmative. 
The matter is complicated further by the actual process of ratification.  
The proposed Constitution provided that states would decide whether to 
ratify in “Conventions”165 instead of in extant state legislatures.  The 
                                                                                                                            
 160. See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Most-Cited Federalist Papers, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 403 
(1998). 
 161. Manning, supra note 14, at 1339.  For an interesting colloquy with Professor Manning 
on the propriety of reference to The Federalist in constitutional decisionmaking, see William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1306–07 (1998); Ira C. Lupu, Time, the Supreme Court, and The 
Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1324 (1998). 
 162. See Clinton Rossiter, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, at viii–lx (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961); Cecil L. Eubanks, New York: Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, in 
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 300, 310 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 
1989). 
 163. Manning, supra note 14, at 1351–52. 
 164. Eskridge, supra note 161, at 1309. 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”). 
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framers of the Constitution chose this method of ratification for two 
reasons.  First, “[p]opular ratification provided more than a symbolic 
affirmation of popular sovereignty; it promised to render a constitution 
legally superior to ordinary acts of government that also expressed popular 
consent through mechanisms of representation.”166  Second, Federalists 
made a more “pragmatic and political” judgment that the Constitution 
stood a better chance of ratification in special conventions than in state 
assemblies, because the latter might be reluctant “to approve a constitution 
circumscribing their legislative power and autonomy.”167 
Each state’s ratifying convention was composed of delegates selected 
by the people in a special vote for that purpose.168  In New York there was 
something akin to an organized Anti-Federalist party with a traditional 
party apparatus,169 and men who stood for election elsewhere as delegates 
often were identified as Federalists or Anti-Federalists.170  If, as some 
originalists maintain,171 the authoritative understanding is that of the 
average citizen at the time of the ratification, then the delegate system 
suggests that the debates at the state conventions are of limited use in 
ascertaining the original understanding.  If it is fair to assume that citizens 
chose delegates to the conventions based on their pledged willingness to 
support (or oppose) the Constitution, then the decision about whether to 
                                                                                                                            
 166. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 101. 
 167. Id. at 102–04.  Edmund Randolph, speaking at the Philadelphia convention, put it less 
charitably: “Whose opposition will be most likely to be excited agst. The System?  That of the 
local demogagues [sic] who will be degraded by it from the importance they now hold.”  2 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 109, at 89. 
 168. See Lance Banning, Virginia: Sectionalism and the General Good, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 261, 277 (Virginia); Edward J. Cashin, Georgia: Searching for 
Security, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 93, 93 (Georgia); Eubanks, supra 
note 162, at 300, 317 (New York); Michael Allen Gillespie, Massachusetts: Creating Consensus, in 
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 138, 147 (Massachusetts); John P. Kaminski, 
Rhode Island: Protecting State Interests, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 368, 
383 (Rhode Island); Donald S. Lutz, Connecticut: Achieving Consent and Assuring Control, in 
RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 117, 129 (Connecticut); MAIN, supra note 
91, at 214–15 (Maryland); id. at 242–43 (North Carolina); id. at 188–89 (Pennsylvania); Gaspare 
J. Saladino, Delaware: Independence and the Concept of a Commercial Republic, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 29, 41 (Delaware); Sara M. Shumer, New Jersey: Property and 
the Price of Republican Politics, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 71, 72 (New 
Jersey); Robert M. Weir, South Carolina: Slavery and the Structure of the Union, in RATIFYING THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 201, 201 (South Carolina); Jean Yarbrough, New Hampshire: 
Puritanism and the Moral Foundations of America, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 
162, at 235, 238–39 (New Hampshire). 
 169. See MAIN, supra note 91, at 233–34.  In New York, Governor George Clinton ran a 
well-organized political machine and was a staunch opponent of the Constitution.  Id. 
 170. See id.  
 171. See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text. 
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ratify had effectively already been made when the delegates arrived at the 
convention.172  The historical records reflect that the debates at the 
conventions were more than perfunctory and swayed some votes one way or 
the other, although it appears that more Anti-Federalist delegates voted to 
ratify than Federalist delegates voted to oppose.173  By and large, however, 
the average citizen had effectively already made his decision about whether 
to ratify when his chosen delegate arrived at the convention.  In at least 
two states (New Hampshire and Rhode Island), towns formed committees 
to issue “instructions” to delegates about how to vote at the convention.174  
Because many Anti-Federalist delegates in New Hampshire were convinced 
by arguments at the convention in favor of the Constitution, the 
convention was forced to adjourn so that delegates could confer with their 
constituents before convening again with instructions to ratify.175  The 
delegates’ (that is, the ratifiers’) understanding of the Constitution’s 
meaning, therefore, is relevant only if one assumes either that it is a valid 
proxy for citizen understanding, or that citizens selected delegates not to 
represent faithfully established citizen views, but rather to exercise 
independent judgment about what was in the best of interest of the 
delegates’ constituents. 
It is beyond the scope of this project to resolve (if, indeed, that is 
possible) these questions that have long vexed the search for original 
understanding.  It suffices for present purposes to note that “[t]he existence 
of ‘original disagreement’”176 greatly complicates the quest for original 
                                                                                                                            
 172. James Madison, for one, expressed his belief (which surely confirmed everything that 
Anti-Federalists thought of the Constitution’s anti-democratic tendencies) that there were 
subjects to which the capacities of the bulk of mankind are unequal and on which they 
must and will be governed by those with whom they happen to have acquaintance and 
confidence.  The proposed Constitution is of this description.  The great body of those 
who are both for & against it, must follow the judgment of others not their own. 
LETTER OF MADISON TO RANDOLPH (Jan. 10, 1788), reprinted in 10 PAPERS OF MADISON 354, 
354–56 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977), quoted in RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 139. 
 173. See MAIN, supra note 91, at 256. 
 174. Rhode Island had a particularly circuitous route to ratification.  The state first refused 
to send delegates to the Philadelphia convention, and then refused to take action on the proposed 
Constitution until March 1788, when voters in a referendum lopsidedly rejected a proposal to 
convene a ratifying convention.  Over the next two years, the state Assembly defeated motions for 
a convention nine times; the ninth time was in response to instructions from towns to delegates to 
the Assembly.  After the new national Congress proposed a Bill of Rights (and threatened to 
impose economic sanctions on Rhode Island if it failed to ratify) the Assembly voted to hold a 
convention, and then elected delegates on Feb 8, 1790.  The convention ratified the Constitution 
on May 29 in a closely divided vote.  See Kaminski, supra note 168, at 379–85. 
 175. See Yarbrough, supra note 168, at 238–39. 
 176. Powell, supra note 42, at 950. 
36 52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2004) 
 
52:1 Smith Smith Pages 2.doc (8/24/2004 9:20 AM) 
meaning.  With these difficulties in mind, I turn now to the results of my 
study of the Court’s actual practice in citing views from the founding era. 
III.   THE COURT’S SOURCES OF FEDERALISM: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
A. Preliminary Matters 
First, a note about scope.  For this project, I reviewed every federalism 
case decided by the Court since 1970, shortly before President Nixon 
appointed William H. Rehnquist  to the Supreme Court.177  Defining which 
cases would constitute the study’s pool of cases required the drawing of 
some arbitrary lines.  The “federalism” cases that I considered exhibited the 
following characterstics: (1) they involved in a direct way178 the extent of 
the power of the federal government or the state governments,179 or the 
boundary between federal and state power; (2) they required for their 
decision reference to (a) a provision of the Constitution as originally 
                                                                                                                            
 177. I also reviewed hundreds of federalism cases decided before 1970, from Chisholm v. 
Georgia,  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)—perhaps the first big federalism case—to Maryland v. Wirtz, 
392 U.S. 183 (1968), which addressed an issue that has perplexed and divided the Court since.  I 
have not included these cases in the study for two principal reasons.  First as explained above, see 
supra notes 72–87 and accompanying text, although originalism has some historical pedigree as a 
method of constitutional interpretation, extensive reference to the documentary history of the 
founding era is a relatively new development.  Supreme Court federalism decisions before 1970 
cited to the specific views of individuals from the framing and ratification period only sporadically 
at best; it is therefore highly suspect (and quite difficult) to draw any conclusions from the data 
sample about citation tendencies.  Second, because both federalism and originalist methodologies 
have experienced a revival on the current Court, the principal object of the study is to compare 
the citation pattern of the majority on the current Court to that of the current Court’s dissenters in 
federalism cases. 
 178. Many cases indirectly involve the powers of the federal and state governments or the 
boundary between federal and state power.  To take but one obvious example, the debate over 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the protections of the Bill of Rights was in no 
small part a debate over federalism—that is, over whether the Constitution limited the powers of 
the state governments in the area of criminal procedure.  Such cases turn on an interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which I have (mostly) excluded from the study.  See infra notes 190–
193 and accompanying text. 
 179. I have also excluded several categories of cases that involve limits imposed by specific 
constitutional provisions on the respective powers of the state and federal governments, because 
those cases implicate structural principles or concerns over individual rights that transcend 
concerns over federalism.  For example, I have not included cases involving the Bill of Attainder 
or Ex Post Facto clauses, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 & § 10, cl. 1, or any of the other provisions 
in Article I, sections 9 and 10, even though those provisions expressly limit the powers of the state 
and federal governments.  For the same reason, I have excluded habeas cases.  (As it turns out, 
very few habeas cases involve discussion of views from the founding era, so their exclusion from 
the study does not have any distorting effect.)  For similar reasons, I have not considered cases 
that turn on interpretation of the amendments (other than the Tenth) in the Bill of Rights. 
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ratified, (b) the Tenth Amendment,180 (c) the Eleventh Amendment,181 or 
(d) a principle inferred from the structure of the Constitution; (3) the 
Court produced at least one opinion that sought to ascertain the original 
understanding;182 and (4) the decisions were not unanimous.183  Guided by 
                                                                                                                            
 180. Although the Tenth Amendment was not part of the Constitution as originally 
ratified, it confirmed the theory of enumerated powers, which the Constitution’s proponents had 
offered to allay Anti-Federalist concerns about the breadth of the national government’s power.  
See supra notes 144–151 and accompanying text. 
 181. Although the Eleventh Amendment, which Congress formally proposed to the states 
for ratification in 1794, was not ratified until late 1797, the Court has held that it “confirmed, 
rather than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle; it follows that the scope 
of the States’ immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by 
fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
728–29 (1999).  Cases that Federal Courts casebooks once referred to as “Eleventh Amendment” 
cases now turn not on the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment, but on the original 
understanding of state sovereign immunity. 
 182. For example, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), both Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court, see id. at 166 (“In providing for a stronger central 
government, . . . the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the 
power to regulate individuals, not States.”), and Justice Stevens’s dissent, see id. at 210 (“[T]he 
Framers of the Constitution empowered the Federal Government to exercise legislative authority 
directly over individuals within the States, even though that direct authority constituted a greater 
intrusion on state sovereignty.”), purported to seek the original understanding, but Justice White’s 
dissent appears to have rejected originalism as the appropriate interpretive methodology, see id. at 
207 n.3 (“One would not know from reading the majority’s account, for instance, that the nature 
of federal-state relations changed fundamentally after the Civil War. . . . Moreover, the majority 
fails to mention the New Deal era, in which the Court recognized the enormous growth in 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.”). 
 183. There are very few unanimously decided federal cases that cite to founding era views.  
See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 99 (2000) (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 12 
(Alexander Hamilton), 44 (James Madison), and 64 (John Jay) for the proposition that Congress 
has authority “to regulate interstate navigation, without embarrassment from intervention of the 
separate States”); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 368–69 (1990) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 
(Alexander Hamilton)).  It is equally defensible to attribute the views cited in these cases to both 
the more conventional majority and dissenting blocs, or simply not to attribute them to either 
side.  I have chosen the latter path. 
I have also excluded the relatively rare cases in which the voting breakdown differs 
significantly from the conventional federalism voting pattern.  For example, Justice Souter’s 
opinion for the majority in American Insurance Associates v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003), 
cites THE FEDERALIST NOS. 42, 44 (James Madison), and 80 (Alexander Hamilton) for the 
nationalistic view that the Constitution broadly prohibits the states from engaging in foreign 
relations; but the opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Breyer—Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.  I have not 
included this small group of cases in the study because it would be impossible to characterize the 
views of the majority and dissenting Justices categorically as I have with the cases included in the 
study. 
If there were many unanimous decisions or cases in which the decision produced 
nonconventional voting blocs, then it might suggest that the debate I describe below between the 
majority and the dissent is more heat than light.  But the cases in these two categories constitute a 
tiny percentage of the federalism cases overall, and therefore are more readily considered the 
exception to the rule rather than the rule itself. 
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this definition, I selected and reviewed cases involving state sovereign 
immunity;184 Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce;185 the 
dormant commerce clause;186 preemption;187 federal common law;188 
abstention;189 and several other topics. 
Conspicuously absent from this list is the Fourteenth Amendment, 
which, along with the other Reconstruction Amendments, “were intended 
to be, what they really are, limitations of the power of the States and 
enlargements of the power of Congress.”190  I have excluded most 
Fourteenth Amendment cases for two often overlapping reasons.  First, 
many Fourteenth Amendment cases involve (in a more direct way than 
most federalism cases) constraints imposed on state power in order to 
protect individual rights.191  In this sense, the Fourteenth Amendment is 
more like the limits on state power in Article I, section 10, which I have 
not included in the study.  Second, to the extent that the Court is 
concerned with the original understanding in Fourteenth Amendment 
cases, it is generally concerned with the original understanding of the 
                                                                                                                            
 184. See supra note 181. 
 185. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3. 
 186. The Court has long interpreted the affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce to imply limits on the power of the states over interstate commerce.  See, 
e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 (1997); Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 187. Because federal statutory law is the “supreme Law of the Land,” “any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding,” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, 
state laws that conflict with federal law or “stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution” of federal law are preempted, see California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 
(1989).  Federalism concerns have led to the development in preemption cases of the canon of 
construction that “[t]he exercise of State authority in a field traditionally occupied by State law 
will not be deemed preempted by a federal statute unless that was the clear and manifest purpose 
of Congress.”  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 18 (1984) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 
(Alexander Hamilton)). 
 188. Although limits on the power of the federal courts to develop common law often are 
phrased in terms of the separation of powers, the development of federal common law also raises 
federalism concerns because of the Supremacy Clause.  See generally Bradford R. Clark, Federal 
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996). 
 189. Judicial solicitude for “Our Federalism,” see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971), 
has led the Court to develop a complex doctrine in which federal courts abstain from hearing 
“cases where necessary to promote the integrity of state law and respect the autonomy of state 
judicial bodies.”  1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-28, at 568 (3d 
ed. 2000). 
 190. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879). 
 191. The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, which requires reference not to the debates between 
eighteenth-century Federalists and Anti-Federalists, but to the debates 
between the proponents and opponents of Reconstruction.192  When cases 
involving the Fourteenth Amendment have also involved interpretation of 
the original Constitution or the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments, however, 
I have included them here.193 
This brief statement about the scope of the study reveals that there is 
an uncomfortable imprecision in any attempt to draw conclusions from 
even a “comprehensive” consideration of Supreme Court federalism 
decisions.  Even if the question of scope were easily resolved, problems (in 
addition to the general hazards of empiricism in legal scholarship)194 would 
still arise in the analysis of the Court’s citation patterns.  As will become 
evident below, one cannot draw conclusions from the Court’s reliance on 
particular founding-era statements without a careful consideration of 
context.  For example, mere reference to Anti-Federalist views does not 
demonstrate reliance on Anti-Federalist views to determine original 
meaning; those views can be cited just as easily (and often are by the 
dissent) to demonstrate that they did not represent the original 
understanding. 
Context also matters in other ways.  It is not uncommon for the 
majority and the dissent to rely on the same founding-era statement to 
support competing views of the original understanding.  In such instances, 
the framer cited (and the view he expressed) is generally less important 
than the manner in which the Court has deployed the statement.  These 
disagreements have implications for originalism, but not in the same way as 
the disagreements over which framing-era voices matter.  In other words, 
although the results of the study discussed below are important, they do not 
exhaust the ways in which reasonable minds can disagree about the original 
understanding; one cannot simply infer from the existence of debate on the 
                                                                                                                            
 192. For an example of a case in which the Court canvassed the Reconstruction ratification 
debates in an attempt to discern the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, see 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 193. Accordingly, I have included cases involving whether Congress has acted validly 
pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the states’ sovereign 
immunity, because those cases also turn on an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and the 
constitutional structure.  See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).  
Conversely, I have not included cases involving Congress’s section five power when the question 
of abrogation was not at issue.  See, e.g., City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507. 
 194. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal 
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2002). 
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Court over the original understanding that the competing factions on the 
Court in fact do rely on competing framing-era views. 
With these difficulties in mind, I divided citations to founding-era 
views into three general categories: nationalistic statements by proponents 
of the Constitution; more tempered, federalistic statements by Federalists 
offered as responses to Anti-Federalist arguments about the Constitution’s 
meaning; and statements by Anti-Federalists about the Constitution’s 
meaning.  The third category presented no difficulties of definition or 
characterization, other than the historical difficulty of determining 
conclusively that the individual cited was in fact an opponent of the 
Constitution.  Similarly, the first category is fairly easily identifiable; it is 
not difficult to identify a particular statement—take, for example, 
Randolph’s assertion at the Philadelphia convention that he hoped to 
create “a strong consolidated union, in which the idea of states should be 
nearly annihilated”195—as strongly nationalistic. 
It is the second category that creates difficulties.  There is no easy way 
to quantify statements by the degree to which they represent “nationalistic” 
or “federalistic” views, and accordingly, I have had to draw somewhat 
arbitrary lines.  Some Federalist arguments are susceptible to competing 
interpretations, and only a consideration of other statements and materials 
can shed light on the degree to which they truly were nationalistic.  To take 
one example that I discuss in greater detail below,196 the Federalists argued 
(without much interpretive disagreement from the Anti-Federalists) that 
unlike under the Articles of Confederation, which required Congress to rely 
on the states to implement national law, the new national government 
would have power directly over the people.197  This argument is quite 
nationalistic in one sense, because it defends a grant of sovereign power to 
the national government; but if (as the majority on the Court has argued) 
the Federalists should also be understood to have argued implicitly that 
Congress would no longer enjoy the authority to use the states as 
intermediaries, then the argument is also federalistic, because it denies to 
the national government one means of implementing and enforcing federal 
law.  To decide which category best fits this Federalist argument, I 
necessarily had to assume the conclusion to the question over which the 
Court has battled: that the Federalists in fact intended the argument to be 
nationalistic, not federalistic.  With the exception of these difficulties at 
                                                                                                                            
 195. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 109, at 24. 
 196. See infra notes 304–307 and accompanying text. 
 197. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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the margin, however, it is generally not difficult to distinguish between 
statements that emphasized consolidation over federation (such as 
Randolph’s) and statements that offered interpretations of the proposed 
Constitution that would preserve a larger role for the states (such as 
Madison’s insistence in The Federalist that the states would retain “a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty”198). 
Another difficulty stems from the nature of political argumentation.  
Although many of the statements that I have placed in this category almost 
certainly were offered by their authors in response to Anti-Federalist 
arguments, it is often impossible to know which were responsive to specific 
Anti-Federalist arguments, which were simply intended to characterize the 
Constitution in terms more palatable to a suspicious public, and which were 
genuine statements of belief about the intended meaning of the proposed 
Constitution.  Although these difficulties of historical context present 
significant problems for a court attempting to discern the original 
understanding,199 they are not particularly problematic for this study; the 
relevant data for purposes of this study are the majority’s or dissent’s simple 
choices between nationalistic or federalistic statements from the founding 
era. 
It should not be surprising that statements by supporters of the 
Constitution vary in the depth of their support for a strong, consolidated 
union.  There was a diversity of views even among the Constitution’s 
proponents, and after the Philadelphia convention, the Federalists made a 
sustained effort to respond to Anti-Federalist criticisms not only to ensure 
ratification, but also to fix the original understanding according to their 
own views.  As Professor Rakove explained, “the framers were involved in 
an effort not only to advance the arguments most likely to counter Anti-
Federalist objections but to present as well their own understandings of the 
considerations that had prevailed at the Convention and their individual 
assessments of the Constitution.”200  Federalist statements from the 
ratification period thus speak with something short of consensus. 
B. Results 
Careful consideration of the Court’s pattern of citing founding-era 
views to discern the original understanding demonstrates that the Court’s 
                                                                                                                            
 198. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
 199. See Eskridge, supra note 161, at 1309 (“The Federalist cannot be understood without 
exploring the larger historical context.”). 
 200. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 155. 
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current majority in federalism cases201 gives substantially more weight than 
does the dissent202 to Anti-Federalist views.  The majority often cites Anti-
Federalist views to suggest that the understanding of the Constitution as 
ratified accommodated Anti-Federalist concerns.  When the dissent cites 
Anti-Federalist views, on the other hand, it does so exclusively to 
demonstrate that the Constitution was understood to mean precisely what 
the Anti-Federalists complained it meant.  In other words, whereas the 
dissent consistently cites Anti-Federalist views to demonstrate that Anti-
Federalist fears were realized at the ratification, the majority cites them to 
demonstrate that Anti-Federalist hopes (tempered as they may have been) 
were realized upon ratification.  Table One reflects that the majority cited 
Anti-Federalist hopes as evidence of meaning twelve times, whereas it cited 
Anti-Federalist fears as evidence of meaning only three times; the dissent, 
on the other hand, never cited Anti-Federalist hopes as evidence of 
meaning (that is, never concluded that the Constitution was originally 
understood to accommodate Anti-Federalist views), but cited Anti-
Federalist fears as evidence of meaning (that is, concluded that the 
Constitution meant precisely what the Anti-Federalists feared it would 
mean) twenty-seven times. 
 
TABLE ONE:  ANTI-FEDERALISTS’ STATEMENTS 
 
 Anti-Federalist Hopes 
Cited as Evidence of 
Meaning  
Anti-Federalist Fears 
Cited as Evidence of 
Meaning 
Majority 12 3 
Dissent 0 27 
 
To the extent that the majority relies on Federalist views in 
establishing the original understanding, it is substantially more likely than 
the dissent to cite Federalist statements that appear to have been made to 
allay Anti-Federalist fears about the power of the national government, or 
that (at a minimum) demonstrate more solicitude for state autonomy.  
Although the dissent often cites Federalist statements in this category to 
                                                                                                                            
 201. I have included the following Justices in this group: William Rehnquist, Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Lewis Powell, and Warren 
Burger. 
 202. I have included the following Justices in this group: David Souter, John Paul Stevens, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, William Brennan, 
Byron White, and William Douglas. 
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demonstrate the original understanding, it is just as likely to argue that 
these Federalist statements, although ostensibly expressing a more 
restrictive view of national power, should be read in context to indicate a 
more robustly nationalist view.  Table Two reveals that the majority cited 
Federalists’ statements demonstrating solicitude for state autonomy eighty-
one times as evidence of original meaning, and never attempted to discount 
such statements by reading them narrowly in light of the context in which 
they were made.  The dissent, conversely, sometimes cited such statements 
to reflect the original understanding (seventeen times), but more often 
argued that they should be read narrowly in light of the context in which 
they were made (thirty-one times). 
TABLE TWO:  FEDERALISTS’ FEDERALISTIC STATEMENTS 
 
 Cited as Authoritative 
Evidence of Meaning 
Read Narrowly in Light 
of Context 
Majority 81 0 
Dissent 17 31 
 
The dissent is substantially more likely than the majority to cite as 
evidence of the original understanding the more unabashedly nationalist 
views of Federalists.  The majority, on the other hand, rarely cites these 
nationalistic statements as evidence of original meaning; instead, the 
majority either discounts these views as outside the framing mainstream, or 
reads them more narrowly or in a context that renders them more 
federalistic in nature.  Table Three shows that the majority cited 
Federalists’ robustly nationalist statements as evidence of the original 
understanding only eight times, whereas it discounted such statements as 
outside the framing the mainstream or read such statements narrowly in 
context sixty-three times.  The dissent, on the other hand, cited such 
statements seventy-eight times as evidence of the original understanding, 
and never discounted them. 
 
TABLE THREE: FEDERALISTS’ NATIONALISTIC STATEMENTS 
 








to Seem Less 
Nationalistic 
Majority 8 7 56 
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Dissent 78 0 0 
 
Numerical summaries do not give a nuanced portrait of the Court’s 
citation patterns; as explained above, context is everything in the 
categorization reflected in the tables.  Accordingly, I discuss the findings in 
greater detail below. 
1. Reliance on Anti-Federalist Views 
In light of the nature of the ratification debate, the originalist must 
choose how to treat Anti-Federalist views.  The originalist can plausibly 
argue that although the Anti-Federalists lost the war over whether the 
Constitution should be ratified, there is no reason to think that the Anti-
Federalist lost every specific battle over how various provisions of the 
Constitution should be understood.  Therefore, the originalist might choose 
to cite Anti-Federalist concerns about the meaning of the Constitution to 
demonstrate that the delegates at the state ratification conventions would 
never have voted to ratify the Constitution unless it accommodated their 
concerns. 
This is not the originalist’s only plausible treatment of Anti-Federalist 
views.  Conversely, the originalist can argue that the Constitution was 
ratified notwithstanding the Anti-Federalists’ frequently expressed 
disapproval of many provisions, and that their statements demonstrated 
their “understanding” of the Constitution.  Thus, the originalist can argue 
that Anti-Federalist fears were realized upon ratification.203 
The current Court’s federalism majority has almost always followed the 
former approach,204 and the dissent has only followed the latter approach.  
                                                                                                                            
 203. Generally the originalist cannot establish the original understanding without reference 
to the views of the Constitution’s proponents as well, and it is impossible to assess the degree to 
which Anti-Federalist views represented the conventional understanding without considering the 
Federalists’ responses.  I discuss the Court’s treatment of Federalist responses to Anti-Federalist 
arguments below.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
William Eskridge has argued that strategic statements by Anti-Federalists attacking the 
Constitution (that is, Anti-Federalist statements intended not to “fix” meaning but to defeat 
ratification) “are worth little in understanding the provision if it is adopted, because their 
incentives are to exaggerate and distort the meaning and effect of the provision.”  Eskridge, supra 
note 161, at 1318.  He argues, however, that “responses by key supporters to opponents’ attacks, 
such as The Federalist and sponsor colloquies in Congress, are potentially worth a great deal 
because of their strategic posture.”  Id.; see infra notes 240–242 and accompanying text. 
 204. See Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution’s Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New 
Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 615, 645 (1995) (“In essence, the New 
Federalists seem to view the Constitution almost as if it was a compromise between those who 
drafted it and their opponents.”). 
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In the state sovereign immunity cases, for example, the majority has cited 
Anti-Federalist fears that “the Constitution would make unconsenting 
States subject to suit in federal court” to demonstrate that the Constitution 
was not originally understood to permit such suits.205  In Welch v. Texas 
Department of Highways and Public Transportation,206 Justice Powell cited 
statements by Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Richard Henry Lee 
expressing that view, and concluded that the Constitution simply would 
not have been ratified had these Anti-Federalist fears not been allayed.207  
Similarly, the majority has argued on more than one occasion that the 
Anti-Federalist-influenced amendments that several state conventions 
proposed upon ratification208 meant that the states would not have ratified 
the Constitution as proposed if it had not incorporated Anti-Federalist 
views on the immunity of states from suit.209 
Justice Powell described the approach explicitly in his dissent in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,210 one of the last federalism 
decisions in which the members of the current majority found themselves in 
dissent.  The Court in Garcia held that Congress had the authority to 
require the states to pay a minimum wage to their employees; Justice Powell 
dissented, arguing that the Tenth Amendment precluded Congress from 
interfering with such internal state functions.  He explained that “initial 
opposition to the Constitution was rooted in the fear that the National 
                                                                                                                            
 205. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987) (holding 
that Congress did not express in unmistakable statutory language in the Jones Act its intention to 
abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
 206. 483 U.S. 468. 
 207. Id. at 483. 
 208. The state convention in Rhode Island, for example, declared upon ratification that 
“the judicial power of the United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not extend 
to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person against a state,” and sought an 
amendment “to remove all doubts or controversies respecting the same.”  1 DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 336 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES].  The New York convention issued a 
similar declaration.  Id. at 327–29.  These declarations and proposed amendments expressed (or 
responded to) Anti-Federalist concerns.  See MAIN, supra note 91, at 248. 
 209. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 718–19, 724–25 (1999); Welch, 483 U.S. at 483.  
The Court made clear in Alden that the proposed amendments were relevant to discerning the 
original understanding of the Constitution as originally proposed—that is, before the adoption of 
the Eleventh Amendment.  See 527 U.S. at 718.  The majority argued that the Anti-Federalist 
view of state sovereign immunity, embodied in the amendments proposed upon ratification in 
Rhode Island and New York, was incorporated into the Constitution even without the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Cf. id. at 741 (arguing that Founders did not believe that Congress would have 
power to abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity, because otherwise the “well-known creativity, 
foresight, and vivid imagination of the Constitution’s opponents” would have produced an 
objection). 
 210. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
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Government would be too powerful and eventually would eliminate the 
States as viable political entities.”211  He cited the views of several 
prominent Anti-Federalists—including the comments of George Mason at 
the Virginia Convention and a polemic by Agrippa, a noted Anti-Federalist 
commentator—and the fact that several of the state conventions had, at 
the urging of Anti-Federalists, proposed amendments to make explicit a 
reservation of powers to the states.212 
Justice Thomas has been particularly aggressive in citing Anti-
Federalist views.  In his concurrence in United States v. Lopez,213 for 
example, he cited the views of The Federal Farmer and Melancton Smith, a 
prominent New York Anti-Federalist, to demonstrate that “commerce” was 
originally understood to mean only bartering and selling of goods.214  In his 
dissent in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton215 (in which he was joined by 
all of the members of the current federalism majority except Justice 
Kennedy), Justice Thomas cited the views of George Mason to demonstrate 
that the founding generation understood the Qualifications Clauses216 to 
create only a floor for requirements for federal representatives, not (as the 
majority contended) a ceiling.217  Justice Thomas also relied in Term Limits 
on the views of Thomas Jefferson (who supported ratification but was 
                                                                                                                            
 211. Id. at 568 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Farber, supra note 204, at 645. 
 212. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 568–69 (citing George Mason, ADDRESS IN THE RATIFYING 
CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA (1788), reprinted in ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS 208, 
208–09 (John D. Lewis ed., 1967); LETTERS OF AGRIPPA (1788), reprinted in 1 BERNARD 
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 510, 511–13 (1971)).  Justice 
Powell also cited a famous letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee that reflected the 
predominant Anti-Federalist concerns.  See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 568–69 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(citing LETTER FROM SAMUEL ADAMS TO RICHARD HENRY LEE (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 
ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS, supra, at 159).  Adams was more of a confederalist than 
a nationalist, and his views are closely identified with the Anti-Federalist cause.  However, he 
ultimately supported ratification in Massachusetts.  See Gillespie, supra note 168, at 138. 
To be sure, there is a difference between arguing that Anti-Federalist concerns found voice in 
the provisions of the Constitution as originally enacted (as did the Court in Welch and Alden) and 
that Anti-Federalist concerns found voice in a provision (such as the Tenth Amendment) of the 
Bill of Rights, which is conventionally thought to be the Anti-Federalists’ lasting legacy in the 
Constitution.  See, e.g., THE ESSENTIAL ANTIFEDERALIST, supra note 104, at ix.  Justice Powell 
went one step further, arguing that because the Tenth Amendment incorporates Anti-Federalist 
views, it must do more than simply confirm the theory of enumerated powers, which even 
nationalist proponents of the Constitution conceded in the course of defending the Constitution.  
See WILSON, supra note 149, at 339–40. 
 213. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 214. Id. at 585–86 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 215. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 216. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.1; id. § 3, cl. 3. 
 217. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 869–70. 
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sympathetic to Anti-Federalist concerns)218 to demonstrate that the states 
retained authority to set additional qualifications for federal 
representatives.219 
The current federalism dissenters, on the other hand, have cited Anti-
Federalist views only to demonstrate that the Constitution was understood 
to mean precisely what the Anti-Federalists feared it would mean.220  In the 
state sovereign immunity cases, for example, the dissenters have 
consistently cited Anti-Federalist fears that the Constitution would divest 
the states of immunity from suit to demonstrate that the Constitution in 
fact was originally understood either to divest the states of their immunity 
or (at a minimum) to authorize Congress to abrogate the states’ immunity.  
The dissenters have, in a series of cases, cited such fears expressed by 
Patrick Henry,221 George Mason,222 Thomas Tredwell,223 The Federal 
                                                                                                                            
 218. See, e.g., 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME: JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT 
25–26 (1970); Powell, supra note 25, at 1363–64.  Jefferson was an advocate of limited 
government, and he believed that “[t]he true theory of our Constitution is surely the wisest and 
best, that the States are independent as to everything within themselves, and united as to 
everything respecting foreign nations.  Let the General Government be reduced to foreign 
concerns only . . . .”  LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO GIDEON GRANGER (1800), reprinted 
in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON DEMOCRACY 30 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1939). 
 219. See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 873–74, 913–14 n.37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 220. The only arguable instance of the dissenters citing Anti-Federalist views as direct 
evidence of the Constitution’s meaning is fully consistent with the dissenters’ general approach of 
referring to Anti-Federalist fears as evidence of the original understanding.  In United States v. 
Morrison, Justice Souter agreed with the majority that “the listing in the Constitution of some 
powers implies the exclusion of others unmentioned,” and he cited as evidence statements to that 
effect made by Federalists to argue that a bill of rights would be unnecessary.  529 U.S. 598, 638 & 
n.11 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45 (James Madison) and 84 
(Alexander Hamilton); REMARKS OF JAMES WILSON AT THE PENNSYLVANIA CONVENTION, 
reprinted in 2 DEBATES, supra note 208, at 434, 436–37).  Justice Souter then acknowledged that 
“[t]he Federalists did not, of course, prevail on this point” because “most States voted for the 
Constitution only after proposing amendments and the First Congress speedily adopted a Bill of 
Rights.”  529 U.S. at 638 n.11 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter thus agreed that Anti-
Federalist views are embodied (at least at a high level of generality) in the Bill of Rights, but 
rejected the argument that Anti-Federalist views are embodied in provisions of the Constitution 
as originally adopted.  Id. 
 221. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 142–43 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that Henry opposed the Constitution in part because he believed that states would be 
suable in federal court even under diversity jurisdiction; cited to demonstrate either that Henry’s 
fears were realized upon ratification or that there was a diversity of views at the founding); id. at 
139–40 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that Henry objected to the Constitution because it did 
not guarantee common-law protections of liberty; cited to demonstrate that the Constitution, as 
the Anti-Federalists argued, did not protect unenumerated common-law rights, including the 
“right” of state sovereign immunity); Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 
468, 505 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Henry thought states could be sued, and 
that he was “not persuaded by the rhetoric of Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall,” because the 
Virginia Convention “endorsed an amendment” that would have eliminated the citizen-state 
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Farmer,224 and Brutus.225  Similarly, the dissenters have cited the Anti-
Federalist-inspired amendments proposed at several state ratification 
conventions that would have eliminated Article III’s citizen-state diversity 
clause or made explicit protection for state sovereign immunity to 
demonstrate either that there was no consensus on the question of 
immunity at ratification,226 or that “the delegates did not believe that state 
sovereign immunity barred all suits against States.”227 
The dissenters have treated Anti-Federalist views the same way in 
other contexts.  In Printz v. United States, Justice Stevens argued that the 
Constitution was originally understood to permit Congress to compel state 
officers to enforce federal law.  In support, he cited statements by Brutus 
and Patrick Henry expressing concern over the potential for an overbearing 
presence of federal tax collectors,228 and a subsequent statement by Patrick 
Henry expressing concern that if it did not create a federal tax collecting 
force, Congress could simply order state officials to perform the task.229  
Similarly, in Term Limits, Justice Stevens argued (for the majority) that the 
opposition of seven prominent Anti-Federalists to the Constitution on the 
                                                                                                                            
diversity clause); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 266 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that Henry thought it clear that Article III subjected states to suit). 
 222. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 138–39 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that  Mason 
objected to the Constitution in part because under it “the people would not be ‘secured even in 
the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law’” (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 109, at 637)); Welch, 483 U.S. at 505 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(noting that Mason thought that the Constitution authorized individual suits against states); 
Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 264–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Mason expressed 
the view at the Virginia convention that Article III provided for jurisdiction over suits against 
states and would have the effect of abrogating immunity). 
 223. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 139 n.35 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that  Tredwell 
objected at the New York convention that the Constitution did not guarantee common-law 
protections of liberty). 
 224. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 271–72  (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting at length from 
an essay by the Federal Farmer complaining that Article III subjected states to suit in federal 
court). 
 225. See id. at 273 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Brutus thought that Article III 
subjected states to suit in federal court, and that he objected as a result). 
 226. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 778–81 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he state 
ratifying conventions’ felt need for clarification on the question of state suability demonstrates 
that uncertainty surrounded the matter even at the moment of ratification.”). 
 227. Welch, 483 U.S. at 505 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 278 
n.28 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he delegates to these conventions did not find such a 
limitation in Article III itself.”). 
 228. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 946 n.5 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 229. See id. at 947 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Federalists responded to Brutus’s and 
Henry’s initial concern about an overbearing federal tax collection force by arguing that Congress 
would simply rely on state officers to collect federal taxes, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander 
Hamilton), a suggestion that did little to allay Henry’s concerns about excessive national power. 
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ground that it did not include a requirement that federal representatives 
“rotate” in office—that is, that federal representatives be forced to 
relinquish office after a certain term—confirmed that the Constitution not 
only did not require rotation, but also did not permit a state to impose an 
analogous requirement.230  In addition, the majority in Term Limits argued 
that Anti-Federalist-inspired amendments proposed by the New York, 
Virginia, and North Carolina ratification conventions to limit the terms of 
federal representatives demonstrate that the Constitution that those states 
did ratify did not set term limits.231 
A member of the federalism majority has cited Anti-Federalist 
statements to demonstrate that the Anti-Federalists’ fears were realized by 
ratification only once,232 and it was, perhaps fittingly, to support an 
argument that a different constitutional provision should be read in a 
manner more solicitous of state autonomy.  In his dissent in Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,233 Justice Thomas noted that 
Brutus and other prominent Anti-Federalists were concerned that Article I, 
section ten’s prohibition of state duties on imports or exports would leave 
states with direct taxation as the only way of raising revenue.234  Justice 
Thomas concluded that these Anti-Federalist fears (although perhaps 
exaggerated) were realized upon ratification, and further argued that 
                                                                                                                            
 230. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 812–13 & n.23 (1995) (citing 
Melancton Smith and George Livingston at the New York convention; Turner and Kingsley at 
the Massachusetts convention; and letters by Samuel Bryan (Centinel I), G.L. Turberville, and 
Mercy Otis Warren (A Columbian Patriot)); cf. id. at 812 n.22 (noting that delegates to the 
Philadelphia convention defeated a proposal requiring rotation); id. at 813 n.24 (noting that 
Thomas Jefferson expressed concern about the absence of a rotation requirement). 
 231. Id. at 813–15 & n.25. 
 232. The majority has, on occasion, acknowledged that not all Anti-Federalist arguments 
found a receptive audience.  In Printz, for example, Justice Scalia responded to the dissent’s 
suggestion that European federalism considers federal commands to individual states to be 
consistent with notions of state autonomy, see Printz, 521 U.S. at 976–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting), 
by noting that Patrick Henry had unsuccessfully argued at the Virginia convention that 
Switzerland’s confederacy proved that the Constitution’s consolidation was unnecessary, see id. at 
921 n.11.  Justice Scalia cited Henry (along with Madison’s and Hamilton’s discussions in The 
Federalist of other nations’ systems) to demonstrate merely that “our federalism is not Europe’s.”  
Id. 
 233. 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
 234. Id. at 631–33 & n.16 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing BRUTUS 1 (Oct. 18, 1787) in 13 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 149, at 415; JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TO WILLIAM CRANCH 
(Oct. 14, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 149, at 222; GEORGE LEE 
TURBERVILLE TO JAMES MADISON (Dec. 11, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 
149, at 407; A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN, A REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE LATE 
CONVENTION (Oct. 28, 1787), in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 117, at 79; Vox 
Populi, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, Oct.–Nov. 1787, in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 117, at 47). 
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because the clause was originally understood to be the Constitution’s only 
limitation on state authority over interstate and foreign trade, the “dormant 
commerce clause”235 doctrine is an unwarranted and unduly broad 
restriction on state power.236 
2. Reliance on Federalists’ Federalistic Statements 
In Missouri v. Jenkins,237 Justice Thomas explained in his concurring 
opinion that “[w]hen an [Anti-Federalist] attack on the Constitution is 
followed by an open Federalist effort to narrow the provision”—what 
Justice Thomas referred to as a Federalist attempt to “sell” the provision to 
the public—“the appropriate conclusion is that the drafters and ratifiers of 
the Constitution approved the more limited construction offered in 
response.”238  The dispute in Jenkins—whether a district court had exceeded 
its authority in requiring salary increases for school employees and increased 
funding for education programs as a means to desegregate Kansas City’s 
schools239—was as much about the separation of powers (that is, the power 
of the federal judiciary to impose remedies on states for constitutional 
violations) as it was about federalism.  But Justice Thomas and the other 
members of the federalism majority have followed this approach (albeit 
without a specific roadmap such as the one that Justice Thomas provided in 
Jenkins) in pure federalism cases, as well. 
William Eskridge has tentatively endorsed240 the propriety of this 
approach.  In comparing reliance on The Federalist in constitutional 
interpretation to reliance on legislative history in statutory interpretation, 
he explained that responses by Federalists to Anti-Federalist arguments 
against ratification 
are potentially worth a great deal because of their strategic posture. 
When key supporters respond to attacks, they are motivated to win 
over undecided players, without alienating fellow supporters of the 
measure. Thus, the key players seek out enough common ground that 
                                                                                                                            
 235. Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the Court has interpreted the 
affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce to imply a limitation on 
the power of the states over the same subject.  See generally 1 TRIBE, supra note 189, at 1029–1102. 
 236. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 237. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
 238. Id. at 126 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 
U.S. 334, 367 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)). 
 239. 515 U.S. at 73. 
 240. Professor Eskridge has criticized the originalist approach to statutory interpretation.  
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987). 
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the proposed measure will garner majority support. Opponents are 
alert to any potential inconsistency between the sponsors’ statements 
and the plain meaning of the proposed measure.241 
Therefore, the more tempered (and less nationalistic) statements in The 
Federalist, Eskridge argued, helped to “persuade[ ] fence-sitters” and “provide 
a firmer basis for understanding . . . the Constitution that was ultimately 
adopted.”242  The argument applies equally to statements at the state 
ratification conventions by the Constitution’s supporters. 
One must, however, take statements of political persuasion with a 
grain of salt.  Because The Federalist is “a piece of political advocacy”—and 
an anonymous one at that—its “contents may at times reflect the 
exigencies of the debate, rather than a dispassionate account of 
constitutional meaning.”243  Accordingly, John Manning has argued that 
“[h]owever revered it may have become in retrospect,”244 The Federalist is of 
limited value “as a window into the reasonable ratifier’s likely 
understanding.”245  This is not to say that The Federalist is irrelevant to the 
search for the original understanding; Manning’s argument does suggest 
that some Federalist statements designed to respond to Anti-Federalist 
concerns do not, in and of themselves, reflect the original understanding.  
This is especially so when one considers that the Federalists made numerous 
statements in other contexts that ascribed a more nationalistic meaning to 
various provisions of the proposed Constitution. 
I do not intend to suggest which approach to the Federalists’ more 
federalistic statements ought to govern the search for original meaning.  
The brief discussion above demonstrates that there is merit to both 
approaches, assuming one accepts that originalism is the appropriate 
interpretive methodology.  Instead, I describe the competing approaches 
merely to preface the discussion of the way in which the competing blocs 
on the Court have cited such statements. 
As noted above, the majority consistently follows the former approach.  
Indeed, the majority cited federalistic statements by Federalists eighty-one 
times as evidence of the original understanding, and did not discount such 
statements even once; state sovereign immunity cases illustrate this trend.  
The majority has repeatedly cited the comments of James Madison and 
                                                                                                                            
 241. Eskridge, supra note 161, at 1318. 
 242. Id. at 1319. 
 243. Manning, supra note 14, at 1339. 
 244. Id. at 1351. 
 245. Id. at 1354. 
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John Marshall246 at the Virginia convention and Alexander Hamilton in 
The Federalist No. 81247 to demonstrate that the Constitution was originally 
understood to incorporate (and preserve inviolate) the principle of state 
sovereign immunity.  Madison and Marshall made their statements in direct 
response to Anti-Federalist arguments that the citizen-state diversity clause 
                                                                                                                            
 246. At the Virginia ratifying convention, George Mason argued that Article III’s citizen-
state diversity clause appeared plainly to permit individuals’ suits against states, a state of affairs 
that he found intolerable.  See 3 DEBATES, supra note 208, at 526–27.  James Madison responded 
by arguing: 
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state is much 
objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any 
state into court. . . . It appears to me that [the citizen-state diversity clause] can have no 
operation but this—to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a 
state should condescend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it. 
Id. at 533.  Anti-Federalists reacted to Madison’s statement with incredulity, suggesting that 
Madison’s defense was inconsistent with the plain language of the clause.  John Marshall took the 
floor to defend Madison’s view: 
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another state, its jurisdiction has 
been decried with unusual vehemence.  I hope that no gentleman will think that a state 
will be called at the bar of the federal court.  Is there no such case at present?  Are there 
not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not 
sued?  It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a 
court.  The intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other 
states.  I contend this construction is warranted by the words.  But, say they, there will be 
partiality in it if a state cannot be defendant. . . . It is necessary to be so, and cannot be 
avoided. I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does not prevent its being 
plaintiff. 
Id. at 555–56.  When the Virginia convention ratified the Constitution, it proposed an 
amendment to clarify that the states would enjoy immunity from suit.  See id. at 660–61 
(proposing a revised Article III that did not provide for jurisdiction over controversies between 
states and citizens of other states). 
 247. Alexander Hamilton offered a similar reading of Article III in THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, 
one of the most frequently cited Federalist Papers.  See Lupu, supra note 160, at 406 (explaining 
that THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 is the third most-cited Federalist Paper, appearing in twenty-seven 
Supreme Court decisions).  Hamilton argued: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual 
without its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the 
exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of 
every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the 
plan of the convention, it will remain with the States and the danger intimated must be 
merely ideal. . . . [T]here is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the 
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own 
way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good faith.  
The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the conscience of 
the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.  They confer no right of 
action independent of the sovereign will.  To what purpose would it be to authorize suits 
against States for the debts they owe?  How could recoveries be enforced?  It is evident 
that it could not be done without waging war against the contracting State; and to 
ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a preexisting 
right of the State governments, a power which would involve such a consequence, would 
be altogether forced and unwarrantable. 
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of Article III subjected states to suits by individuals.  Hamilton seems to 
have written his essay, initially intended to shape the debate over 
ratification in New York, to respond to similar concerns.  These statements 
together account for almost one-third of the majority’s citations in this 
category248 and two-thirds of the citations in this category that the 
dissenters have discounted by reference to context.249 
The Court first offered these statements by Madison, Marshall, and 
Hamilton as a justification for judicial recognition of state sovereign 
immunity in 1890 in Hans v. Louisiana,250 and the Court has continued to 
cite them in all of its most recent state sovereign immunity cases. In Alden 
v. Maine,251 the Court stressed that Madison’s, Marshall’s, and Hamilton’s 
views (which the Court cited, collectively, five times) represent the 
“original understanding of the Constitution” in large part because the trio 
were the “leading advocates” of the Constitution’s ratification.252  Similarly, 
in Welch, the Court insisted that in light of Anti-Federalist fears about the 
prospect of state amenability to suit, “the representations of Madison, 
                                                                                                                            
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 248. Twenty-five of the majority’s eighty-one citations in this category were to the 
comments of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton about state sovereign immunity.  Specifically, the 
Court cited some or all of these statements in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State 
Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 752 (2002) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander 
Hamilton)), Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716–18 (1999) (citing comments of Madison, 
Marshall, and Hamilton), Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997) (citing 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)), Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69–70 
nn. 12–13 (1996) (citing comments of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall), Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 780 n.1 (1991) (citing comments of Madison, Marshall, and 
Hamilton), Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468, 480–
83 & n.10 (1987) (citing comments of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton), and Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651, 660 n.9 (1974) (citing comments of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton).  In 
addition, Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell cited the statements in their respective dissents in 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 435–36 & n.3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and Patsy v. Board 
of Regents of the State of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 526–27 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 249. Twenty-one of the dissenters’ thirty-one citations in this category were to the 
comments by Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton about state sovereign immunity.  See Alden, 527 
U.S. at 773–75 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 143–49 (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 310 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19 (1989) (opinion of Brennan, J.), 
overruled by Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261; Welch, 483 U.S. at 505–09 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 265–80 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Employees of the Dep’t of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health and 
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 316–17 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 292 n.7 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). 
 250. 134 U.S. 1, 12–15 (1890); see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 
323–25 (1934). 
 251. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 252. Id. at 727–28. 
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Hamilton, and Marshall . . . may have been essential to ratification.”253  
Then–Associate Justice Rehnquist advanced the same claim in his dissent 
in Nevada v. Hall, noting that Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton 
“repeatedly assured opponents of the Constitution, such as Patrick Henry, 
that the sovereign immunity of the States was secure,” and argued: 
[a]lthough there were those other than opponents of the 
Constitution who suggested that Art. III was an abrogation of state 
sovereign immunity—Edmund Randolph and James Wilson being 
the most eminent—this Court has consistently taken the views of 
Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton as capturing the true intent of the 
Framers.254 
The dissenters, on the other hand, have argued that these same 
statements by Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton must be read in context, 
for it is the context that reveals that such statements were intended to 
suggest only that nothing in Article III would eliminate the state-law 
immunity that states would enjoy in suits brought under the citizen-state 
diversity clause, suits that (they assumed) would be governed by state law.  
Justice Souter argued in his dissent in Alden that Hamilton’s discussion in 
The Federalist No. 81 of suits against states to recover debts reveals that 
Hamilton intended to address only diversity suits.255  Similarly, in his dissent 
in Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter relied on Hamilton’s suggestion in The 
Federalist No. 32 that delegations of power to the national government 
(such as the power to regulate interstate commerce) would result in a 
concomitant “alienation” of the rights of sovereignty that the states had 
enjoyed before ratification (such as immunity from suit)256  to argue that 
Hamilton must have been referring in No. 81 only to diversity suits.257  
Justice Brennan made similar arguments about No. 81 in his concurring and 
dissenting opinions in Feeney,258 Atascadero,259 and Welch,260 adding that The 
                                                                                                                            
 253. Welch, 483 U.S. at 483. 
 254. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 436 n.3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 n.9 (1974) (arguing that the statements of Madison, 
Marshall, and Hamilton represented “the prevailing view at the time of the ratification”). 
 255. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 773 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 256. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 257. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 144–49 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 258. 495 U.S. 299, 310 n.4 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that Hamilton’s 
discussion applied only to diversity jurisdiction: “He used it in a passage reassuring States, which 
might have been concerned with the securities they issued and might not have wished to honor, 
that the grant of diversity jurisdiction in Article III would not annul their defense of sovereign 
immunity should they be sued in federal court under state law on a writ of debt.”). 
 259. 473 U.S. 234, 275–78 & n.25 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) should be read along with NOS. 32 and 80 (Alexander 
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Federalist No. 80 also suggested that Hamilton believed that Congress had 
authority to abrogate the states’ immunity in federal question cases.261  The 
dissenters have given similar treatment to Madison’s and Marshall’s 
comments at the Virginia Convention,262 and Justice Brennan exemplified 
the approach when he noted that “[t]heir fervent desire for ratification 
could have led them to downplay the features of the new document that 
were arousing controversy.”263 
The respective approaches of the majority and the dissent to founding-
era views on state sovereign immunity are representative of their 
approaches to federalistic statements by the Constitution’s supporters in 
other contexts.  Consider the treatment of The Federalist Nos. 39 and 45.  In 
No. 39, Madison famously sought “to ascertain the real character of the 
government” created by the Constitution; he argued that it was in some 
respects federal—that is, in the nature of a confederacy—and in some 
respects national.264  The essay clearly was a response to Anti-Federalist 
arguments that the proposed government would be an unwarranted 
consolidation of power; indeed, Madison refers directly to the claims of the 
Constitution’s opponents.265  The federalism majority regularly cites one 
particularly federalistic passage from No. 39: Madison’s argument that the 
national government’s “jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects 
only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty 
over all other objects.”266  The dissenters, in contrast, have cited No. 39 
                                                                                                                            
Hamilton) to mean that sovereign immunity would be a valid defense in state-law diversity suits 
in federal court, but not when the source of the claim is federal law). 
 260. 483 U.S. 468, 511–13 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “context” for 
Hamilton’s comments in THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 was the states’ liability for debts that arose 
under state law). 
 261. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If there are such things as 
political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being co-extensive with its 
legislative may be ranked among the number.”). 
 262. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 775–78 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole 
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 143 n.39 (Souter, J., dissenting); Welch, 483 U.S. at 504–09 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 263. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 270 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 264. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
 265. Id. at 245 (“[T]he operation of the government on the people in their individual 
capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, will, in the sense of its opponents, on 
the whole, designate it, in this relation, a national government.”). 
 266. Id.  The majority has cited THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 for this point nine times in its 
recent federalism decisions.  See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 
751 (2002); Alden, 527 U.S. at 714, 715; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919, 921 (1997); 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2; Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 570 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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only once (in Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in Garcia), to 
suggest that protection “for the States’ ‘residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty’” lies not in federal courts but “in the shape of the 
constitutional scheme.”267  The same pattern holds for citations to The 
Federalist No. 45, in which Madison continued his argument that the states 
would enjoy substantial authority under the proposed Constitution.  The 
majority has cited Madison’s argument that the powers “which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite”268 five 
times;269 the dissenters have never cited the passage, although they have 
cited other portions of the paper.270  The pattern holds with respect to other 
commonly cited Federalist Papers.271 
                                                                                                                            
 267. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.  In Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in Bush v. Gore, she 
cited NO. 39 for the proposition that solicitude to the state legislature’s role in the selection of the 
President should not obscure the role of the state itself in the process.  531 U.S. 98, 142 n.3 
(2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Although several questions of federalism lurked in the 
background in Bush, I did not count it in my study.  In any event, Justice Ginsburg’s cite to THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39 was not to support a claim of state autonomy over federal supremacy, but 
rather was intended to support an argument about intra-state authority.  In addition, Justice 
Kennedy cited No. 39 in his concurring opinion in Term Limits, see 514 U.S. at 841, but Justice 
Kennedy is (with this exception) a member of what I have called the federalism majority. 
 268. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
 269. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 457–58 (1991); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 570–71 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.2. 
 270. Justice Brennan cited NO. 45 in his dissent in National League of Cities v. Usery to argue 
that the states are protected by the structure of the federal government.  426 U.S. 833, 876 (1976) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.  In Printz, both Justice Souter and 
Justice Stevens cited a different portion of NO. 45 to argue that Madison stated the conventional 
understanding when he argued that the national government could use state officers to collect 
federal taxes.  521 U.S. at 974 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 947, 959 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
Justice Scalia cited the same passage in his majority opinion in Printz, but read it more narrowly 
than the dissenters, id. at 910–11, and Justice Thomas cited the paper generically in his 
concurrence in Lopez to support his view that Congress lacks power to regulate activities that 
substantially affect commerce, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 592–93 (Thomas, J., concurring).  The majority 
has never cited Madison’s statement in NO. 45 that “as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot 
be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the 
former be sacrificed to the latter.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison). 
 271. The majority has cited THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander Hamilton) four times, see 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 571 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 
473 U.S. at 238 n.2; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 591 (Thomas, J., concurring), and NO. 46 (James 
Madison) three times, see Garcia, 469 U.S. at 571, 575 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting); Atascadero, 
473 U.S. at 238 n.2, for the proposition that “[t]he Framers recognized that the most effective 
democracy occurs at local levels of government, where people with firsthand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing with them,” Garcia, 469 
U.S. at 575 n.18 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The majority has not cited other portions of The 
Federalist that suggest that (at least Hamilton) did not see this virtue as an argument for judicial 
intervention to protect state autonomy.  In NO. 27, for example, Hamilton argued that the federal 
government would attain the primary loyalty of the people if it were better administered than the 
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Finally, consider the Court’s treatment of The Federalist Nos. 51 and 
28, in which Madison and Hamilton respectively argued that the separation 
of powers and the structure of the federal union (or, in Madison’s words, the 
“compound Republic”) would protect the rights of the people.  As Madison 
explained: 
the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two 
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each 
subdivided among distinct and separate departments.  Hence a 
double security arises to the rights of the people.  The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will 
be controlled by itself.272 
The majority has cited the relevant passages of Nos. 51 and 28 eight times 
to support judicial intervention to protect the states.273  The dissenters, on 
the other hand, have never cited (in a federalism case) the relevant 
passages from either paper,274 even though such passages arguably support 
                                                                                                                            
state governments, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), which Madison plainly 
thought was likely, see STORING, supra note 89, at 41.  Indeed, Hamilton made clear in NO. 17 
that the people would reward the state governments with their loyalty only if those governments 
“administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 17 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
 272. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  Hamilton made the same argument in NO. 
28: 
[I]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely the 
masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power, the general 
government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state 
governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government. 
The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly make it 
preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the 
instrument of redress. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 273. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 922 (citing THE FEDERALIST  NO. 51 (James Madison) and NO. 
28 (Alexander Hamilton)); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 576  (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51 twice); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992) (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458–59 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 28 and 51); 
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 582 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51); cf. Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 601 n.9 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander 
Hamilton) as support for the power of the Court to review federal law to protect state 
sovereignty); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting) (same). 
 274. Justice Blackmun referred to NO. 51 in his dissent in Coleman v. Thompson (a habeas 
case), but he cited a very different passage—Madison’s statement that “[j]ustice is the end of 
government.  It is the end of civil society.”  501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51) (James Madison).  In addition, Justice Brennan cited different 
portions of NO. 51 in two First Amendment cases.  See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 n.22 
(1982) (free exercise of religion); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 56 n.7 (1982) (freedom of 
speech). 
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the dissenters’ view that the courts have at most a limited role in protecting 
state autonomy.275 
Although the dissent has cited Federalist responses to Anti-Federalist 
concerns as authoritative evidence of the original understanding, it has 
generally done so only when the Federalist response supported a more 
expansive conception of federal power.  For example, both Justices Stevens 
and Souter relied on Hamilton’s (in The Federalist No. 36) and Madison’s 
(in The Federalist No. 45) responses to Anti-Federalist fears that the 
national government’s taxing power would lead to an overbearing army of 
federal tax collections officers.  Madison and Hamilton attempted to allay 
Anti-Federalist fears by suggesting that the national government would rely 
on state officers to implement federal law.276  The dissenters cited these 
statements to demonstrate that the founding generation understood that 
Congress had the authority to require state officials to enforce federal law.277  
Similarly, in his dissent in Seminole Tribe, Justice Souter credited as 
indicative of the original understanding Marshall’s responses to Anti-
Federalist arguments that Article III was unduly broad.  Marshall attempted 
to meet Anti-Federalist objections by emphasizing the limited powers of the 
national government,278 but Justice Souter cited this federalistic defense to 
support his view that the Constitution did not render immutable the 
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.279 
                                                                                                                            
 275. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551–53; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 276. Hamilton wrote: 
Many specters have been raised out of this power of internal taxation to excite the 
apprehensions of the people . . . . [T]he probability is that the United States will either 
wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the 
State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 36 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (“If 
the federal government is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs 
also. . . . [I]t is probable that . . . the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the 
Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several 
States.”).  Madison’s and Hamilton’s responses did little to assure Patrick Henry.  See 3 DEBATES, 
supra note 208, at 167–68. 
 277. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 946–47, 959  (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 974 (Souter, J., 
dissenting).  Justices Stevens and Souter also cited THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander 
Hamilton), see 521 U.S. at 947–48 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 971–75 (Souter, J., dissenting), 
and Justice Souter also cited NO. 44 (James Madison), see 521 U.S. at 972–73. 
 278. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 140–41 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(citing 3 DEBATES, supra note 208, at 553). 
 279. Justice Souter argued that Marshall’s response “assumes no generalized reception of 
English common law as federal law; otherwise, ‘arising under’ jurisdiction would have extended to 
any subject comprehended by the general common law.”  517 U.S. at 141 (Souter, J., dissenting); 
see also id. at 139 (noting statements of George Nicholas, Edmund Randolph, and Edmund 
Pendleton at the Virginia convention agreeing with Anti-Federalists that the Constitution did 
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The dissent has been more likely to read Federalist statements 
responding to Anti-Federalist concerns as it has in the cases addressing state 
sovereign immunity; that is, narrowly, either by invoking context or by 
citing other statements by the same authors that are even more unabashedly 
nationalistic.  For example, in Term Limits, Justice Stevens cited The 
Federalist NO. 32, which explained that the states would “retain all the 
rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that 
act, exclusively delegated to the United States,”280 to support the argument 
that the states cannot “reserve” a power that did not exist before the 
ratification (such as the power to set qualifications for federal office holders 
in a newly created national government).281  Justice Brennan turned 
Hamilton’s defense of the theory of enumerated powers (in The Federalist 
No. 31) against a rule protecting integral state functions from federal 
regulations by noting that Hamilton believed that the federal government 
was limited in the exercise of its enumerated powers only by “regard to the 
public good and to the sense of the people.”282  Similarly, in Garcia, Justice 
Blackmun argued that Madison, by assuring that the states would retain a 
“residuary sovereignty,”283 meant that the states’ sovereignty would be 
secured solely through “the workings of the National Government itself,” 
not by “judicially created limitations on federal power.”284 
3. Reliance on Federalists’ Nationalistic Statements 
The differences between the majority and the dissenters are most 
pronounced in their respective treatment of the more robustly nationalistic 
statements of the Federalists during the founding era.  The dissent has cited 
such statements seventy-eight times, all as evidence of the original 
understanding.  Of the majority’s seventy-one citations to such statements, 
only eight were offered as evidence of the original understanding; of the 
remaining sixty-three, the majority discounted seven as representing views 
                                                                                                                            
not import common protections because that would make them immutable) (citing 3 DEBATES, 
supra note 208, at 451, 469–70, 550). 
 280. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 281. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801–02 (1995). 
 282. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 857 n.1 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 31 (Alexander Hamilton), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)). 
 283. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550–52 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison)). 
 284. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552; accord Usery, 426 U.S. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 
THE FEDERALIST NOS. 45 and 46 (James Madison) to demonstrate that Madison believed that the 
structure of the national government would protect state sovereignty). 
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that were outside the framing mainstream, and read fifty-six narrowly to 
seem less nationalistic. 
For example, the dissent has often cited the views of James Wilson285 
and Edmund Randolph286 as evidence of the original understanding of state 
sovereign immunity.  In his dissents in Alden287 and Seminole Tribe,288 Justice 
Souter collectively cited Wilson’s and Randolph’s views seven times; Justice 
Brennan cited them as well in his dissent in Atascadero.289  The majority, on 
the other hand, has argued that Wilson’s and Randolph’s views represent “a 
radical nationalist vision of the constitutional design that not only deviated 
from the views that prevailed at the time but . . . remains startling even 
today.”290  The majority has also stated that Randolph and Wilson were part 
of a “small minority” whose “views were in tension with the traditional 
understanding of sovereign immunity,”291 and argued that the purported 
views of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton on sovereign immunity 
represent the “true intent of the Framers.”292 
Conversely, although the dissenters have relied on context to limit the 
meaning of Hamilton’s, Madison’s, and Marshall’s statements about 
sovereign immunity, they have cited other statements by the trio suggesting 
                                                                                                                            
 285. As the historian Gordon Wood has explained, Wilson “[m]ore boldly and fully than 
anyone else . . . developed the argument that would eventually become the basis of all Federalist 
thinking” about sovereignty.  WOOD, supra note 90, at 530. 
 286. Although Randolph was not a consistent nationalist voice—he refused to sign the 
Constitution at the end of the Philadelphia convention and had a brief flirtation with the Anti-
Federalist cause before rejoining the Federalists at the Virginia convention,  see RAKOVE, supra 
note 32, at 106–08, 122–23—he believed that Article III authorized jurisdiction over suits by 
individuals against states, and maintained that position not only at the Virginia convention, see 3 
DEBATES, supra note 208, at 207, 573–75, but also as Attorney General and counsel for the 
plaintiff in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419–20 (1793).  (Fortunately for Randolph, James 
Wilson was a Justice on the Supreme Court when the Court decided Chisholm, which held that 
there was jurisdiction over an individual suit for money damages against Georgia.  Id. at 466.)  
Randolph had his nationalist moments at the Philadelphia convention, as well: It was he who 
proposed the Virginia Plan to create not “a federal government” but rather “a strong consolidated 
union, in which the idea of states should be nearly annihilated.”  1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 109, at 24. 
 287. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 772 n.12; id. at 775–78 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
Justice Souter also cited similar views of Charles Pinckney at the South Carolina convention.  See 
id. at 777 n.17. 
 288. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 105 n.4, 139, 143 & n.38, 151–52 & n.45, 163 
n.57 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 289. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 268–69, 270 n.22 (1989) (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
 290. Alden, 527 U.S. at 725. 
 291. Id. at 725–26. 
 292. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 436 n.3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); accord Welch 
v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. at 482–84 (1987) (acknowledging 
Randolph’s and Wilson’s views, but arguing that they did not represent the consensus view). 
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that they believed that Congress would have authority to subject states to 
suit for violations of federal law.  The dissenters have read Hamilton’s 
statements in The Federalist No. 80 as evidence that the Constitution was 
originally understood to authorize jurisdiction over states that violated 
federal rights,293 and they have read other comments by Madison and 
Marshall as evidence that the states’ common law immunity would not be 
rendered immutable by ratification.294  Although the majority has argued 
that Hamilton’s, Marshall’s, and Madison’s views represent the original 
understanding, the majority has not cited these more obviously 
nationalistic statements in its state sovereign immunity decisions. 
The dissent’s embrace (and the majority’s discounting) of Federalists’ 
nationalistic statements has not been limited to the state sovereign 
immunity cases.  In Garcia, Justice Blackmun supported the Court’s defense 
of federal power to regulate the states by citing James Wilson’s observation 
at the Pennsylvania convention that “[a]lthough it presupposes the 
existence of state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose them 
to be the sole power to be respected.”295  In United States v. Morrison,296 
Justice Souter cited statements by Madison, Wilson, Marshall, Hamilton, 
James Iredell, and Samuel Stillman to demonstrate that the founding 
generation understood the Constitution’s structure to be the principal 
source of protection for state autonomy.297  And in Term Limits, Justice 
Stevens (for the Court) cited scores of statements by Federalists suggesting 
that federal representatives had a relationship to the national government 
(and the national polity) that was not subject to alteration by the states.298 
                                                                                                                            
 293. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 156 (Souter, J., dissenting); Welch, 483 U.S. at 501, 506 
n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 294. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 138  (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Marshall 
believed “that ratification would not itself entail a general reception of the common law of 
England”); id. at 139 (noting Madison’s argument that the common law varied too much from 
state to state to be imported uniformly into the Constitution); id. at 151 n.45 (noting that 
Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 22, and Madison, in The Federalist No. 49, argued that sovereignty 
rested only in the people, who could withhold any power they wanted from any level of 
government); id. at 152 (citing Hamilton’s later, consistent view of national power when 
discussing the National Bank); see also id. at 152–53 (citing Marshall’s and James Iredell’s views 
on the Court); id. at 155 (citing Madison’s view, at the Philadelphia convention and in a letter to 
Thomas Jefferson, that unjust state laws were among the prime factors requiring a new, more 
powerful central government). 
 295. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985) (quoting 2 
DEBATES, supra note 208, at 439). 
 296. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 297. See id. at 647–48 & n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 298. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 793 (1995) (noting that 
Hamilton argued at the New York convention that “the people should choose whom they please 
to govern them”); id. at 794–95, 819–22 & n.30 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52, 57 (James 
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When it has not discounted the nationalistic views cited by the 
dissent—we have already seen how Justice Scalia (for the majority in 
Printz) responded to a nationalistic reading of Hamilton’s views299—the 
majority has generally read such statements narrowly in order to be more 
consistent with other, more federalistic statements.  Consider the 
disagreement over whether Congress has authority to direct the states to 
address particular problems of national concern or to enforce a federal 
regulatory program.  In holding that it does not,300 the Court has relied on 
the founding-era consensus (established after the rejection of the New 
Jersey Plan) that the national government would have direct regulatory 
power over individuals.  Specifically, the Court has cited statements by 
Madison and Randolph at the Philadelphia convention supporting the 
Virginia Plan on the grounds that it would avoid the principal defect of the 
Articles of Confederation, which required Congress to act through the 
states as intermediaries;301 statements by Madison and Hamilton in The 
Federalist that people, not states, were the only proper objects of 
government;302 and statements to the same effect by various Federalists at 
the state conventions.303 
                                                                                                                            
Madison) and 36 (Alexander Hamilton), and the comments of James Wilson, Carey Nicholas, 
Robert Livingston, John Stevens, Timothy Pickering, John Dickinson, and Noah Webster for the 
same proposition); id. at 806–09 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52, 57 (James Madison) and 59 
(Alexander Hamilton), and the comments of Madison and Gouverneur Morris at the Philadelphia 
convention, for the proposition that states would have no role in setting qualifications for federal 
representatives); id. at 809–10 (noting that Madison, Nathaniel Gorham, Randolph, Rufus King, 
and Hamilton agreed at the Philadelphia convention that states should not have power to set 
federal representatives’ salaries); id. at 813–14 (noting that Livingston and Hamilton argued at 
the New York convention “that rotation was incompatible with the people’s right to choose”); id. 
at 821–22 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), and the comments of G. 
Morris, George Read, and James Wilson at the Philadelphia convention, for proposition that the 
federal government is directly responsible to the people, and chosen by the people, not the states). 
 299. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text; cf. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 856–57 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discounting views of Justice Story because Story’s positions were “more 
nationalist than the Constitution warrants”). 
 300. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot 
compel states to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot compel states to legislate in accordance with 
federal directives). 
 301. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (citing Madison’s comments at the 
Philadelphia convention); Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20 (same); New York, 505 U.S. at 164  (citing 
Randolph’s and Madison’s comments at the Philadelphia convention); Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 793 n.31 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing Randolph’s comments at the Philadelphia convention). 
 302. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15 (Alexander Hamilton) 
and 20 (James Madison and Alexander Hamilton); Printz, 521 U.S. at 919–20 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton)); New York, 505 U.S. at 163, 180 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 15, 16 (Alexander Hamilton), 42 (James Madison), and 20 (Alexander 
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The majority and the dissent agree (as they must, in light of fairly clear 
history) that the framers’ decision to give Congress authority to regulate 
individuals directly was a response to one of the most significant failings of 
the Articles of Confederation, which left the implementation of federal law 
solely to the good faith of the states.304  In this respect, the Federalist 
statements noted above were nationalistic; Randolph, Madison, and the 
others strongly believed that the national government needed more power 
to be effective.  The debate, then, is over the implication of this 
nationalistic argument.  The majority has read the statements according to 
the principle of expressio unius, and reasoned that the national government’s 
new power to regulate individuals directly implied that it would thereafter 
lack the power (which it enjoyed under the Articles) to regulate by using 
the states as intermediaries.305  The dissent has cited the same statements as 
evidence that the founding generation understood the Constitution to 
confer upon Congress a new and additional power.306  The dissent, in other 
words, cited these nationalistic statements to imply nationalistic 
consequences, whereas the majority cited them to imply decidedly 
federalistic consequences.307 
                                                                                                                            
Hamilton and James Madison)); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 792–93 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15 and 16 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 303. New York, 505 U.S. at 165–66 (citing Oliver Ellsworth at the Connecticut convention; 
Charles Pinckney at the South Carolina convention; Rufus King at the Massachusetts 
convention; Hamilton at the New York convention; and Samuel Spencer at the North Carolina 
convention for the proposition that Congress must have power to regulate individuals directly, 
without having to rely on the states for implementation or enforcement); Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 792 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Charles Pinckney at the South 
Carolina convention). 
 304. See supra notes 95–106 and accompanying text. 
 305. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (“In providing for a stronger central government, 
therefore, the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to 
regulate individuals, not States.”). 
 306. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 809 n.39 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
misunderstands THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton)); Printz, 521 U.S. at 945  
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15 and 27 (Alexander Hamilton) to 
demonstrate the original understanding that the Constitution extended the power of federal 
government beyond that which it enjoyed under the Articles). 
 307. The majority followed the same pattern in Justice Thomas’s dissent (joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Scalia) in Term Limits.  Justice Thomas read several 
statements suggesting that there were few requirements for federal officeholders to imply a floor 
(permitting states to add more requirements) rather than a ceiling (preventing the states from 
setting additional qualifications for federal representatives).  See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 860–61 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Madison’s comments at 
the Philadelphia convention and the Virginia convention); id. at 863 & n.10 (citing John Jay at 
the New York convention, Caleb Strong at the Massachusetts convention, Anthony Wayne at 
the Pennsylvania convention, and THE FEDERALIST NO. 59 (Alexander Hamilton)); id. at 880 & 
n.17 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison) and the comments of Noah Webster and 
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There have been instances in which the Justices of the majority have 
cited Federalists’ nationalistic statements as evidence of the original 
meaning,308 but in such instances the majority has generally cited these 
statements to support uncontroversial assertions about the scope of national 
authority as a preface to a discussion of the limitations on that authority.309  
Arguably, then, the quantitative results of the study overstate the frequency 
with which the majority cites nationalistic statements as evidence of the 
original understanding.310 
                                                                                                                            
John Stevens, Jr.); id. at 885 n.18 (citing Madison at the Philadelphia convention and THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 60 (Alexander Hamilton)); id. at 894–95 (citing George Nicholas at the 
Virginia convention and Thomas McKean at the Pennsylvania convention); id. at 898 n.22 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison)).  Similarly, Justice Thomas in his Lopez 
concurrence cited nationalistic statements to imply decidedly federalistic consequences.  See 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590–91 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing OLIVER 
ELLSWORTH, A LANDHOLDER NO. 1, CONNECTICUT COURANT (Nov. 5, 1787), reprinted in 3 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 149, at 399; THE FEDERALIST NO. 35 (Alexander 
Hamilton); A JERSEYMAN: TO THE CITIZENS OF NEW JERSEY, TRENTON MERCURY (Nov. 6, 
1787), reprinted in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 149, at 147; WILLIAM DAVIE, 
COMMENTS AT NORTH CAROLINA CONVENTION, 4 DEBATES, supra note 208, at 20, which 
argued in favor of a new power in Congress to regulate commerce, to suggest that the original 
understanding of commerce was limited to trade); id. at. 592 (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 42 
(James Madison) and 24 (Alexander Hamilton), which argued that the national government 
should have power over bankruptcy and to create a navy, to demonstrate that the conferral of 
those powers, which were related to commerce, means that the founding generation understood 
the commerce power much more narrowly than the Court’s precedents suggest). 
 308. See Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 839, 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NOS. 2 (John Jay) and 39 (James Madison) for the proposition that the United States 
is one nation under republican principles).  Justice Kennedy joined the four regular federalism 
dissenters in Term Limits to embrace a more nationalistic view of the original understanding. 
 309. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 271 (1997) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) to argue that federal guarantees must be 
enforceable in court but concluding that because a state forum is available, federal courts need not 
entertain quiet-title action against Idaho); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging that in THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, Madison argued that the line between state and 
federal authority is largely “political” and in the first instance in the discretion of Congress, but 
concluding that the line must be drawn by the Court, not Congress); New York, 505 U.S. at 158–
61, 163 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison) to demonstrate the conventional 
understanding that the principal defect under the Articles of Confederation was the inability of 
the national government to regulate interstate commerce, and thus that Congress has broad power 
under the Constitution to regulate commerce, but concluding that Congress cannot use commerce 
power to commandeer state legislative processes); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 7, 11, 22 (Alexander Hamilton) and NOS. 42 and 45 (James 
Madison) to demonstrate the understanding that the national government can regulate interstate 
commerce because states lack the practical capability to regulate across state lines, but arguing 
that Congress cannot regulate the states qua states pursuant to the commerce power). 
 310. On the other hand, the quantitative results arguably skew in the other direction.  As 
discussed above, see supra note 183, I have not included cases in which the voting breakdown 
differs markedly from the conventional divide in federalism cases.  In some of those cases, 
however, members of the conventional federalism majority relied on more obviously nationalistic 
views.  For example, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994), 
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IV.   THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ORIGINALISM 
What are the consequences for originalism of the majority’s and the 
dissent’s reliance on strikingly divergent founding-era views?  The results of 
the study suggest that one of the principal justifications for originalism—
that it will constrain the ability of judges to impose their own views in the 
course of decisionmaking—might not be accurate as a descriptive matter.  
The study buttresses some of the most common criticisms of originalism—
in particular, that originalism ultimately is indeterminate, and that (as a 
corollary) judges, facing a difficult (if not impossible) historical inquiry, 
might be tempted to slant the history to serve instrumentalist goals. 
Recall the conventional justifications for originalism.  The social-
contractarian defense holds that “judges may displace legislative decisions 
in the name of the Constitution, but only because the Constitution is a 
social contract to which consent was validly given through ratification.”311  
The principal criticism of the social-contractarian defense of originalism is 
unabashedly nonoriginalist; critics contend that the social contract of 1789 
(or later, with respect to amendments) is simply “out-of-date” with respect 
to some questions and inappropriate as a governing charter for a profoundly 
different society and political culture.312 
The judicial constraint defense of originalism posits that only 
originalist methodology effectively limits the ability of unelected judges to 
impose their own views under the guise of constitutional interpretation.313  
Stated simply, if constitutional meaning is fixed by an understanding 
ascertainable by conventional historiographic methods—in contrast to an 
approach under which constitutional meaning is subject to evolving, 
extratextual norms—unelected judges cannot impose their own views under 
                                                                                                                            
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court cited Hamilton’s and Madison’s concerns about local 
economic protectionism as a justification for limiting state authority under the dormant 
commerce clause.  Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion; Justice O’Connor concurred separately in the judgment; and Justice Souter dissented, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun.  It is difficult to draw conclusions about 
the citation tendencies of the competing federalism blocs from a decision that divided the Court 
in such an unconventional way.  See also United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843, 859–60 (1996) 
(opinion of Justice Thomas, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Breyer, 
JJ.) (citing comments of framers at Philadelphia convention to demonstrate that Export Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5, prohibits federal tax on goods in export transit); id. at 873–74 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (citing comments from Philadelphia convention 
to support opposite conclusion). 
 311. Dorf, supra note 49, at 1766. 
 312. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 58, at 230; Farber, supra note 67, at 1095; Munzer & Nickel, 
supra note 59, at 1032; Grey, supra note 70, at 710–14. 
 313. See Scalia, supra note 13, at 45. 
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the guise of constitutional interpretation.314  The most frequent response by 
critics of originalism is methodological.  Because the historical materials are 
often “incomplete, inaccurate, or conflicting,” even when the materials 
inspire confidence—putting aside whether judges have the ability to engage 
in serious historical inquiry—they rarely contain clear evidence of an 
understanding of the particular constitutional question before the court.  
Faced with these indeterminacies, judges might be tempted—either 
consciously or subconsciously—to read the history in a manner that 
advances their own preferences. 
The study does not directly undermine the social-contractarian 
defense, or provide much traction to the particular attack that critics have 
leveled against it.  If the Constitution is not a social contract—or if it is, 
but should be interpreted differently than conventional contracts—then 
originalism itself is misguided, and the difference between voices cited by 
the majority and the dissent would be beside the point.  But if the 
Constitution ought to be viewed as a social contract—and even most 
“moderate originalists”315 and nonoriginalists accept as much by conceding 
that the very concept of a Constitution means that attention to original 
meaning must play some role in constitutional interpretation316—then the 
fact that judges disagree about the meaning of its ambiguous text does not 
distinguish it from most contracts, which suffer from the inevitable 
interpretive difficulty that arises from the diversity of human 
understanding.  This is not to say that the study has no implications for this 
defense of originalism.  On the contrary, however sound the social-
contractarian defense may be in theory, the profound disagreement over 
what precisely was embraced by the constitutional “meeting of the minds” 
suggests that the defense has not fared well in the translation from theory to 
practice. 
The study has more important implications for the judicial-constraint 
defense.  It suggests that the defense is overstated, and it provides a 
descriptive basis for criticisms of the defense.  The substantial difference 
between the historical voices upon which the current majority and dissent 
rely in establishing original meaning suggests that the original meaning is 
elusive and that originalism has not effectively constrained the ability of 
                                                                                                                            
 314. See id. at 41–47; BORK, supra note 34, at 163; Scalia, supra note 24, at 863.  See 
generally BERGER, supra note 37. 
 315. Brest, supra note 58, at 205. 
 316. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 49, at 1766; Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313 (1996); Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 13, at 115–17. 
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the Justices to decide federalism cases based on their own (albeit genuinely 
held) normative views of the appropriate balance of federal and state 
authority. 
The difference in citation patterns revealed by the study may simply be 
a product of the same difficulties that inhere in any historical inquiry.  It 
may well be that either the majority or the dissent has correctly discerned 
the original understanding, and that the remedy for the differences revealed 
by the study is simply better persuasion.  Perhaps the results of the study do 
not suggest any defect in originalism other than the one that originalism’s 
staunchest proponents readily concede: that “two judges equally devoted to 
the original purpose may disagree about the reach or application of the 
principle at stake and so arrive at different results.”317  As originalists are 
quick to point out, this difficulty “in no way distinguishes the task from the 
difficulties of applying any other legal writing.”318 
I propose that the study suggests something more than a simple 
disagreement in federalism cases about the “reach or application of the 
principle at stake.”  The majority and the dissent disagree on the principle 
itself, yet both sides draw support from the same historical record for their 
sharply conflicting views.  It is for this reason that the study suggests a more 
fundamental problem for originalism; indeed, the study supports the 
argument that originalism’s very historicism is its most significant defect. 
Historians have argued that the nature of the ratification—a debate 
between competing factions that produced an ambiguous document 
susceptible to several equally plausible but conflicting interpretations—
makes ascertainment of a meta-understanding elusive, if not impossible.  As 
Professor Rakove has explained: 
Both the framing of the Constitution in 1787 and its ratification by 
the states involved processes of collective decision-making whose 
outcomes necessarily reflected a bewildering array of intentions and 
expectations, hopes and fears, genuine compromises and agreements 
to disagree.  The discussions of both stages of this process consisted 
largely of highly problematic predictions of the consequences of 
particular decisions.  In this context, it is not immediately apparent 
how the historian goes about divining the true intentions or 
understandings of the roughly two thousand actors who served in the 
                                                                                                                            
 317. BORK, supra note 34, at 163; accord Scalia, supra note 13, at 45 (“There is plenty of 
room for disagreement as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how that original 
meaning applies to the situation before the court.”). 
 318. BORK, supra note 34, at 163. 
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various conventions that framed and ratified the Constitution, much 
less the larger electorate they claimed to represent.319 
Originalism, like any historical inquiry, can shed light on the competing 
views and interests at stake in the creation of the Constitution; but 
originalism’s objective—to extrapolate from the views of a few individuals 
(important as they were to the project of constitutionalism) a broader, fixed 
meta-understanding—distinguishes it from the general objective of the 
historian, and ignores the limits of historical inquiry.320 
It should come as no surprise, then, that well-meaning originalist 
judges can use the historical record to substantiate sharply conflicting views 
of the original understanding. The original understanding is by its very 
nature elusive; we cannot expect more of judges than we do of historians.  
The stark difference with respect to citation patterns between the majority 
and the dissent simply confirms what historians have long known: that the 
quest for original understanding will rarely result in entirely satisfactory (or 
conclusive) answers.  Under this account, the study confirms that history—
especially the history of an event that was so contentious in its day—is 
rarely susceptible to one interpretation. 
The study is also consistent with a significantly more damaging 
criticism of originalism.  The stark—and consistent—difference between 
the founding-era views cited by the majority and the dissent as evidence of 
the original understanding suggests that one of originalism’s principal 
justifications—the judicial-constraint defense—is illusory.  The fact that 
the historical record is susceptible to such conflicting interpretations means 
that there is significant room for judges to slant the historical record to 
serve instrumentalist goals.  I do not mean to suggest here that the Justices 
in the majority or the dissent have in fact manipulated the historical record 
to support their personal views of the appropriate balance between federal 
and state power, although others have leveled that charge.321  The results of 
                                                                                                                            
 319. RAKOVE, supra note 32, at 6. 
 320. As Daniel Farber has explained: 
[it is] somewhat unrealistic to posit a single original understanding.  For example, 
Madison took a notoriously short time to discover that his understanding of the text was 
rather different from that of his fellow delegates Hamilton and Washington.  It might be 
more accurate, therefore, to speak of the range of original understandings that the text 
was capable of supporting in its historical context. 
Farber, supra note 204, at 646–47; see also id. at 647 (suggesting “a more self-conscious selection of 
sources that is keyed to our normative theory of constitutional interpretation”; “If our normative 
theory requires us to determine the general understanding of the text, we are particularly in need 
of reliable evidence of widely shared understandings, as opposed to the viewpoints of a few 
individuals at a particular time.”). 
 321. See Kelly, supra note 61, at 119; Nowak, supra note 25, at 1094. 
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the study need only be consistent with such an account to undermine the 
judicial-constraint defense of originalism. 
No constitutional interpretive methodology is immune from 
instrumentalist manipulation, and originalism at least has other compelling 
justifications to commend it.  But the study is particularly damaging to 
originalist claims precisely because of originalists’ frequent insistence that 
originalism is largely immune from judicial manipulation.  Originalist 
critiques have forced proponents of competing methodologies to address 
candidly the problem of judicial instrumentalism, and to justify their 
approaches notwithstanding that obvious risk.322  The appeal of originalism, 
in contrast, has long been its seeming immunity from charges of judicial 
activism, and originalism’s most prominent proponents have framed their 
defenses of it to underscore this point.323  If originalism as actually employed 
by judges is as demonstrably susceptible to judges’ imposing their own views 
under the guise of constitutional interpretation, then originalists’ critiques 
of other approaches to interpretation seem hollow. 
Justice Scalia might be correct in asserting that “the originalist at least 
knows what he is looking for: the original meaning of the text,”324 and he 
may even be correct that originalism “cater[s]” less to judicial “willfulness” 
than do nonoriginalist methods of interpretation.325  But the results of the 
study suggest not only that the originalist’s object is illusory, but also that 
originalism’s advantage over other approaches to constitutional 
interpretation with respect to its ability to constrain judicial discretion is 
marginal.  Whatever one may say of Justice Scalia’s fidelity to originalism, 
the Court’s opinions—both majority and dissenting—suggest that his 
aspirations for originalism remain unfulfilled. 
What, then, is the role of originalism in constitutional interpretation?  
After all, even if the judicial-constraint defense of originalism is overstated, 
the study does nothing to undermine the social-contractarian defense of 
originalism.  This, perhaps, is unsurprising; it is difficult to argue that the 
original understanding of the Constitution ought to be irrelevant in 
determining the present-day meaning of the document, and it is difficult to 
imagine how the Court’s actual deployment of originalism could undermine 
this basic proposition.  Indeed, if the current meaning of a provision of the 
                                                                                                                            
 322. See, e.g., 1 TRIBE, supra note 189, at 24–29. 
 323. See BORK, supra note 34, at 251–52; Scalia, supra note 13, at 45–46. 
 324. Scalia, supra note 13, at 45.  Justice Scalia even has acknowledged that originalism 
cannot completely “inoculate[ ] against willfulness”; but he finds originalism preferable because 
“unlike aspirationism[,] it does not cater to it.”  Scalia, supra note 57, at 140. 
 325. Scalia, supra note 57, at 140. 
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Constitution need not bear any relationship to what it meant when it was 
adopted, then what is the point of having a Constitution at all?326 
The challenge of constitutional interpretive methodology, then, is to 
accommodate the obvious virtue of originalism—its insistence that the very 
nature of a Constitution as higher law requires fidelity to its constitutive 
meaning—while avoiding its (now apparent) defects.  The study reveals 
that originalism is better at answering some questions of constitutional law 
than others.  Originalism is least controversial—and is most likely to 
preserve fidelity to the social-contractarian theory of the Constitution 
while thwarting judicial instrumentalism—when applied to answer 
questions at a high level of generality.  Conversely, originalism creates 
significant potential for judges to impose their own views under the guise of 
historical inquiry when judges apply it to answer questions on a specific 
level of generality. 
This is unsurprising, in light of the nature of the framing and 
ratification of the Constitution.  The Constitution’s text and the historical 
record are more likely to produce an uncontroversial answer to questions 
posed at a high level of generality; when questions are posed at a high level 
of specificity, both the text and the historical record are likely to be either 
silent or susceptible to competing interpretations.  Consider, for example, 
the question raised in United States v. Lopez, which addressed a challenge to 
a congressional attempt to criminalize the possession of guns within 1000 
feet of a school.327  Reference to the original understanding is of limited 
utility in answering whether Congress enjoys such a power, both because 
the nature of commerce has changed radically in the two centuries since 
ratification, and because the views expressed during the Convention and 
the ratification debates obviously do not address the specific question.  But 
originalism at least can answer an extremely relevant question phrased at a 
higher level of generality: Both the constitutional text and the debates over 
its drafting and ratification reveal consensus that the powers of the federal 
government are not limitless. 
The Court could have decided Lopez by asking whether recognition of 
the congressional authority asserted in the challenged statute would 
effectively have rendered meaningless the one limit that originalist 
methodology could clearly identify: If Congress can rely on the commerce 
power to regulate the localized possession of guns without reference to a 
nexus to interstate commerce, what can Congress not regulate pursuant to 
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 327. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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the commerce power?  The Court cannot provide a coherent answer to that 
question, however, without reference to some other theory about the value 
of federalism.328  Late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century 
attempts to answer the question lacked such a normative theory, and were 
ultimately unpersuasive because they were unduly formalistic and seemingly 
arbitrary.329  If after reference to a normative theory of federalism there is no 
satisfactory answer to the question—and many commentators have noted 
that Justice Breyer’s dissent in Lopez failed to suggest an answer—then the 
Court is fully justified in invalidating the statute on federalism grounds. 
To take another example, we might say with some confidence that the 
first clause of Article I, section 8330 was originally understood to permit 
Congress to spend money to achieve objectives beyond those enumerated 
in the other clauses of section 8;331 we would be hard-pressed, however, to 
discern whether Congress was originally understood to enjoy the authority 
to threaten to withhold all federal funds from a state that fails to comply 
with one particular regulation in a federal spending program designed to 
advance education of children with special needs.332  Because the founding 
generation could not have foreseen the more specific question, reference to 
their understanding is unproductive,333 and the Court must apply some 
other normative theory of the Constitution to answer the question. 
Originalism is most useful in providing general principles of 
constitutional law, but its utility in answering particularized questions—
questions for which there was no discernable original understanding—is far 
more limited.  Preserving the fiction that originalism not only can provide 
an answer to those questions, but also that it can do so while avoiding 
judicial instrumentalism, stunts inquiry into other, equally defensible 
                                                                                                                            
 328. One such theory appears in Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the 
Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). 
 329. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. 
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What distinguishes interpretivism from its opposite is its insistence that the work of the 
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been foreseen—is generally common ground. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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methods of constitutional interpretation.  It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to suggest what other methodology should fill the gap that 
originalism leaves—or provide the coherent, detailed, and workable theory 
of federalism that the historical record does not—but the study described 
here demonstrates at a minimum that originalism is not the panacea that its 
proponents claim it to be. 
CONCLUSION 
In “What the Anti-Federalists Were For,” his essay introducing The 
Complete Anti-Federalist, Herbert Storing lamented that although the Anti-
Federalists are entitled “to be counted among the Founding Fathers,” albeit 
in the “admittedly . . . paradoxical sense” of opponents of the Constitution 
who played a “subordinate part in the founding process,”  in general “they 
have not enjoyed such a position.”334  Professor Storing likely would have 
been heartened by Justice Thomas’s understated observation in 1997 that 
“our ready access to, as well as our appreciation of, such documents 
[including The Complete Anti-Federalist] has increased over time.”335  From 
the results of the study presented in this Article, one can indeed discern 
appreciation on the Court for Anti-Federalist views, just as one can find 
appreciation for the views that the Anti-Federalists most feared.  But 
appreciation for the range of views—at least when measured by frequency of 
citation as evidence of the original understanding—does not appear to be 
shared evenly by the Justices of the majority and the dissent. 
Ironically, it is only now, with both sides in the federalism debate so 
firmly in the originalist camp, that the shortcomings of originalism are more 
apparent and that the deployment of originalism in practice may have 
undermined the propriety of originalism in theory.  Both the well-meaning 
originalist and the cynical originalist for whom the methodology is a 
convenient cover for instrumentalist decisionmaking can find among the 
vast body of primary historical materials statements that support a spectrum 
of constitutional meaning.  Historians have long reveled in the richness and 
diversity of the views that vied for dominance in the founding era, but it is 
such diversity of views that makes the quest for determinate meaning seem 
illusory and ultimately unsatisfying. 
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